The \u27New\u27 Exclusionary Rule Debate: From \u27Still Preoccupied with 1985\u27 to \u27Virtual Deterrence\u27 by Dripps, Donald A.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 37 | Number 3 Article 4
2010
The 'New' Exclusionary Rule Debate: From 'Still
Preoccupied with 1985' to 'Virtual Deterrence'
Donald A. Dripps
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald A. Dripps, The 'New' Exclusionary Rule Debate: From 'Still Preoccupied with 1985' to 'Virtual Deterrence', 37 Fordham Urb. L.J.
743 (2010).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol37/iss3/4
DRIPPS CHRISTENSEN 6/13/2010 8:41 PM 
 
743 
THE “NEW” EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE: 
FROM “STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH 1985” TO 
“VIRTUAL DETERRENCE” 
Donald A. Dripps∗ 
Way before Nirvana 
There was U2 and Blondie 
And music still on MTV 
Her two kids in high school 
They tell her that she’s uncool 
Cause she’s still preoccupied 
With 19, 19, 19851 
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INTRODUCTION 
The exclusionary rule for evidence found in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is, again, in play.  In Hudson v. Michigan,2 the Court held that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s knock-and-announce requirement.  This by itself was not surprising.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, however, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Alito, contained language, 
gratuitous to the result, lamenting the “substantial social costs” of the ex-
clusionary rule, questioning the need for the “massive remedy” of exclu-
sion,3 and claiming the effectiveness of alternative remedies.  The phrase 
“substantial social costs” appears three times in the majority opinion.4  Jus-
tice Breyer’s stout dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Gins-
burg, replied that exclusion would deter violations5 and threw cold water 
on the claim of effective alternatives.6  Justice Kennedy, who joined in the 
majority, filed a concurrence including the assertion that “the continued 
operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, 
is not in doubt.”7  He was the only justice to express this particular view. 
 
 2. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 3. Id. at 595 (“In addition to the grave adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant 
incriminating evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into 
society), imposing that massive remedy for a knock-and-announce violation would generate 
a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule . . . .”). 
 4. Id. at 591, 594, 596. 
 5. Id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he need for deterrence—the critical factor 
driving this Court’s Fourth Amendment cases for close to a century—argues with at least 
comparable strength for evidentiary exclusion here.”). 
 6. Id. (Although reported violations are “legion,” “the majority, like Michigan and the 
United States, has failed to cite a single reported case in which a plaintiff has collected more 
than nominal damages solely as a result of a knock-and-announce violation”). 
 7. Id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Just this January, in Herring v. United States,8 the justices divided into 
the same blocs.  This time, however, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent raised the 
ante, by arguing that the familiar cost-benefit approach to applying the ex-
clusionary rule is misguided.9  For the first time since Justice Brennan left 
the Court, members of the Court appealed to broader justifications for ex-
clusion, including concerns for judicial integrity, judicial review, and long-
run and indirect influences on official behavior.10 
The ideas in this “new” debate, however, are about as fresh as the musty 
air of an antique shop.  The Justices have added nothing to the stock argu-
ments of their predecessors on the Burger Court.  I find myself wearing the 
remains of my hair long, putting on wide ties, reading dismal economic 
news, and seeing in the latest pages of the Supreme Court Reporter the 
United States v. Leon decision11 being countered by appeals to 1983 law 
review articles and prior dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan.12  It could 
be 1985 all over again. 
This Article has two objectives.  The first is to discredit both the majori-
ty and dissenting positions in Herring.  I contend that the loss of evidence 
is a cost of the exclusionary rule, as distinct from the Fourth Amendment, 
only in a precise technical sense.  It is conceptually possible that the rule 
might deter borderline but legal police activity.13  While that cost is con-
ceptually possible, the empirical evidence does not suggest that it is signifi-
cant.14 
Notions of a right to exclude illegally-obtained evidence based on unita-
ry-transaction theories or judicial integrity are equally unsound.15  They 
rest on a conception of substantive Fourth Amendment rights that goes 
beyond personal security and informational privacy to include a constitu-
tional right to private crime.  Moreover, right-to-exclude accounts indeed 
 
 8. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 9. See id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. 
 11. The Herring majority cites United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), seventeen 
times.  See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699 (twice); id. at 700 (five times, counting the citation in 
footnote 2); id. at 701 (four times); id. at 703 (thrice); id. at 703-04 (once); id. at 704 
(twice). 
 12. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) 
(Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather Than an “Empirical 
Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600 (1983); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp 
v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983). 
 13. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
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threaten the good-faith immunity defense in tort,16 with the attendant risk 
of overdeterrence.  If Justice Ginsburg invoked the Brandeis and Brennan 
views of exclusion because she believes that the cost-benefit cases have 
shortchanged deterrence (a correct apprehension), the Herring dissent is 
less than candid, as well as less than logical—a red Herring, as it were. 
My second objective is more constructive.  I have previously suggested 
the suppression of evidence contingent on the failure to pay damages.17  If 
damage actions really were a good remedy for typical violations, I would 
stand by this idea.  Assessing the damages, however, is difficult and dan-
gerous.  If damages are set too high, they will overdeter; if set too low, they 
will underdeter.  Using the administrative machinery of the motion to trans-
late suppression into damages, therefore, takes an interesting road to the 
wrong destination. 
Whether achieved by suppression or by damages, deterrence operates by 
giving the police incentives to prevent future violations.  There are differ-
ent administrative means to this end.  If the violation is negligent, retrain-
ing the officer or instituting more intensive training programs for the wider 
force are plausible options.  If the violation is reckless or intentional, dis-
cipline as well as retraining may be appropriate. 
If the point of exclusion is deterrence, why exclude now and hope the 
police take preventive action later?  Why not, in other words, suppress 
tainted evidence, then give the prosecution the opportunity to prove the 
precise, concrete steps the police department has taken to prevent recur-
rence?  If the court finds the corrective action adequate, the evidence could 
be received; if not, it would be suppressed. 
Part I locates the current controversy in historical context, a prelude to  
Part II’s attack on the Herring majority’s concept of the exclusionary rule’s 
costs and Part III’s attack on the Herring dissent’s turn to theories other 
than deterrence.  Part IV makes the case for my revised contingent exclu-
sionary rule, an approach I call, in keeping with my plea for modernity, 
“virtual deterrence.” 
 
 16. For cases recognizing the defense, see, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 
(1987) (discussing qualified immunity for actions based on Bivens), and Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. 335 (1986) (discussing qualified immunity against actions under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983). 
 17. Donald A. Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1 (2001). 
DRIPPS CHRISTENSEN 6/13/2010  8:41 PM 
2010] THE “NEW” EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 747 
I.  BACK TO THE FUTURE? 
A. The (Unhappy) History of the Exclusionary Rule 
The doctrinal history of the exclusionary rule is well known and can be 
briefly summarized.  Weeks v. United States permitted a pretrial motion for 
the return of property in order to prevent the government’s use of incrimi-
nating evidence against the search victim.18  Weeks made sense given the 
dual doctrines of Boyd v. United States: the Fourth Amendment forbids the 
seizure of evidence other than contraband, fruits, and instrumentalities, and 
the Fifth Amendment forbids the use of the accused’s property to prove his 
guilt at trial.19  Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States retained the exclu-
sionary rule despite a corporation’s lack of Fifth Amendment rights,20 and 
Agnello v. United States blessed the suppression of contraband seized in 
violation of the Fourth.21 
Some states followed Weeks and some states did not.  In Wolf v. Colora-
do the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through 
Fourteenth Amendment due process, but refused to apply the exclusionary 
remedy on unwilling states.22  Twelve years later, Mapp v. Ohio reversed 
the latter holding.23 
The Mapp opinion faithfully reflected the doctrinal incoherence of the 
federal exclusionary rule cases, which remained premised on property 
rights and the self-incrimination privilege, but often disregarded these pre-
mises to reach results calculated to regulate federal law-enforcement agen-
cies, as in Agnello.  Mapp cited the ineffectiveness of other remedies,24 the 
need to deter misconduct,25 and “the imperative of judicial integrity.”26  
Only Justice Black, who supplied the fifth vote, worked from the Boyd doc-
trine to reach the Mapp result.27  Since Twining v. New Jersey28 and Adam-
 
 18. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 19. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 20. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 21. 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (excluding cocaine discovered in a warrantless search of the de-
fendant’s home; the defendant disclaimed possession of the cocaine). 
 22. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 24. Id. at 652-53 (noting the “obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the 
protection of other remedies”). 
 25. Id. at 656 (“Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effec-
tively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’” (citation omitted)). 
 26. Id. at 659. 
 27. Id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring) (questioning pure Fourth Amendment theory but 
embracing that the use at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
violates the Fifth Amendment). 
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son v. California,29—holding that the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
privilege did not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—
were not yet overruled by Malloy v. Hogan,30 this is perhaps not surprising. 
Subsequent cases made clear the salience of the deterrence rationale.  
Linkletter v. Walker31 refused to apply Mapp retroactively, a result consis-
tent with the deterrence theory.  Alderman v. United States32 retained the 
standing requirement, a seeming retention of the Fifth Amendment theory, 
but the opinion took pains to stress that the search victim’s right to exclude 
provided adequate deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.33 
Through Alderman, the history of the exclusionary rule tracks the history 
of the Fourth Amendment generally.  The early federal Fourth Amendment 
cases reflected an “atomistic” conception of the Amendment as protecting 
individual entitlements to property, privacy, and personal security.34  
Searches were defined as tortious trespasses upon private property inter-
ests;35 executive-branch agents could not engage in such trespassory activi-
ty without a judicial warrant;36 warrants by their terms could be issued only 
with probable cause and the agents logically could have no greater power 
without judicial authorization than with it.  Even when authorized by a va-
lid warrant, the seizure of any property other than fruits, instrumentalities, 
or contraband was held to violate the Fourth Amendment.37  Exclusion, ex-
 
 28. 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a right 
against self-incrimination compelled by the states). 
 29. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (affirming that the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a 
right against self-incrimination compelled by the states). 
 30. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does create a right 
against self-incrimination compelled by the states). 
 31. 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (holding that Mapp did not apply to cases that had become final 
on direct review at the time of that decision). 
 32. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
 33. See id. at 174-75 (“The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those 
whose rights the police have violated” is an adequate remedy; further deterrence from third-
party standing is unjustified). 
 34. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 367 (1974). 
 35. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding that wiretapping, 
although prohibited by state statute, does not constitute a search because there is no physical 
trespass). 
 36. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (holding 
that an unlawful search of corporate premises violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 37. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (Under Boyd and Weeks, 
search warrants “may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure 
may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property 
to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police 
power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may 
be taken.” (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 623, 624 (1886))). 
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emplified by Weeks, aimed to restore the status quo ante when the govern-
ment’s agents had broken into private spheres without lawful authority. 
The logic of this atomistic perspective, however, often yielded to the 
“regulatory perspective,” the perceived necessity to discourage lawless ac-
tions by the police, even when those actions could not be equated with tor-
tious invasions of private property rights.  During the Prohibition Era, con-
traband booze could be the subject of suppression and even of return.38  
This surely reflected some degree of sentiment for nullification, but it also 
reflected a quite principled concern that if contraband could not be sup-
pressed there would be no effective deterrent to unconstitutional searches. 
The Warren Court moved further along the regulatory path by classify-
ing electronic eavesdropping without trespass to the suspect as a “search,”39 
and by rejecting the mere-evidence rule that had been the premise for 
search and seizure law since Entick v. Carrington.40  In Terry v. Ohio, the 
Court treated coercive stop-and-frisk practices—tortious prima facie—as 
seizures and searches that could be justified by less than probable cause, 
thus within the power of the police, even though the text of the Constitution 
gives judges no explicit power to authorize them.41 
Linkletter set the stage for a full and candid turn to a regulatory ap-
proach, rooted in deterrence, to the exclusionary rule.  Doctrinal develop-
ment, however, coincided with political change.  Reflecting the electoral 
sentiment of the 1970s, new justices showed more concern for law en-
forcement.  United States v. Calandra embraced a purely deterrent view of 
the exclusionary rule, expressive of a new Supreme Court majority more 
sympathetic to law enforcement than the last.42  Suppression is costly and 
must be justified by deterrent benefits, and an exception should be created 
whenever those benefits are not clear.  Subsequent cases took this approach 
repeatedly.  In only one case—James v. Illinois43—did the Supreme 
Court’s balancing test incline in favor of the defense.  In more than half a 
 
 38. See, e.g., Giles v. United States, 284 F. 208 (1st Cir. 1922) (ordering that liquor 
seized under a defective warrant be excluded from evidence and returned to the defendant). 
 39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding the use of a microphone planted 
on a telephone booth, owned by a telephone company, to be a “search” of the suspect when 
used to eavesdrop on the suspect’s telephone conversation). 
 40. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (upholding seizure of “mere evidence” in-
cluding clothes worn by the suspect during the alleged offense). 
 41. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 42. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that a grand jury witness, given transactional immuni-
ty, could be compelled to answer questions based on evidence that the witness had previous-
ly successfully moved to suppress against himself on grounds of unlawful search). 
 43. 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (holding that the defendant’s statement, obtained while he was 
illegally arrested, was inadmissible to impeach testimony of X, a third-party defense wit-
ness). 
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dozen others (United States v. Janis,44 Stone v. Powell,45 United States v. 
Havens,46 United States v. Leon,47 Massachusetts v. Sheppard,48 Illinois v. 
Krull,49and Arizona v. Evans50), the Court approved government use of 
tainted evidence. 
The majority opinions in these cases stubbornly refused to answer two 
powerful opposing arguments.  The first is that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits some searches that would discover evidence of serious crimes, so 
that the loss of evidence attends any effective deterrent of Fourth Amend-
ment violations.  The description of lost evidence as a “cost” was therefore 
hostile not to the exclusionary remedy, but to the underlying Fourth 
Amendment right, one the justices in the majority did not deride and which, 
in any event, they were sworn to uphold. 
The second argument is that the Court’s opinions gave no criteria for de-
termining when deterrence was expected to be adequate and when it was 
not.  When confronted with case-specific reasons to predict positive incen-
tives for constitutional violations, the stock rejoinder was that these con-
cerns were “speculative.”51 
 
 44. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit 
by the government for unpaid taxes in the absence of any proof of federal participation in 
illegality). 
 45. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that state prisoners may not relitigate suppression mo-
tions on petitions for federal habeas where the state had provided the opportunity for full 
and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim). 
 46. 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that the impeachment exception to the exclusionary 
rule extends to contradiction of testimony elicited by the prosecution from the witness-
defendant on cross-examination). 
 47. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that evidence found pursuant to a warrant issued de-
spite the failure of the application to establish probable cause will be admitted absent per-
jury in the supporting affidavit, partisanship by the issuing judge, or patent inadequacy of an 
application that well-trained police would recognize). 
 48. 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (holding admissible evidence of homicide discovered by search 
authorized by a modified form narcotics warrant that was not modified to particularly de-
scribe the evidence sought, but which was particularly described in the officer’s warrant ap-
plication). 
 49. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding the fruits of search authorized by an unconstitutional 
state statute admissible where the law enforcement officer’s reliance on the statute was ob-
jectively reasonable). 
 50. 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding admissible fruits of search incident to arrest based on an 
erroneous judicially-maintained record of outstanding warrant). 
 51. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (exclusion might encourage police to scrutinize ap-
plications and warrants to prevent judicial errors, but “we find such arguments specula-
tive”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487-88 (1976) (“‘We therefore decline to embrace a 
view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence 
of police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand jury.’” 
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974))). 
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The current state of exclusionary-rule jurisprudence can be summarized 
as the very odd product of progressive doctrine applied by reactionary jus-
tices.  The turn to regulatory Fourth Amendment theory was called for by 
institutional and technological changes quite aside from ideological 
changes on the Court.  Professional police, organized crime, and electronic 
surveillance made the ancien régime untenable.  The reworking of Fourth 
Amendment law away from the atomistic perspective was inevitable and no 
Justice, even one with strong originalist pretensions, seems inclined to re-
think it.52 
B. The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: Hudson and Herring 
1. Hudson 
The issue in Hudson v. Michigan was whether the exclusionary rule ap-
plies to evidence obtained in the search of a residence authorized by a valid 
warrant, but executed inconsistently with the knock-and-announce re-
quirement announced in Wilson v. Arkansas.53  The Court divided five-to-
four, holding that the rule does not apply.  This result could have been 
reached on the ground of inevitable discovery.54  The majority noted as 
much.55 
Part III.B of the opinion nonetheless deployed the now familiar cost-
benefit balancing test.56  The majority went so far as to say that the costs of 
exclusion outweighed the benefits even if the knock-and-announce rule 
would be nullified by withholding this remedy.57  Justice Scalia’s discus-
 
 52. For example, in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), Justice Scalia wrote the 
majority opinion characterizing thermal-imaging of a private residence as a search.  The 
technique would not have been a trespass at common law, and although Justice Scalia noted 
criticisms of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1976), he did not propose returning to the 
trespass regime assumed by the founders. 
 53. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 54. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 604 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In 
this case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of a failure to knock-and-
announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful warrant.  The Court in 
my view is correct to hold that suppression was not required.”). 
 55. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 601 (“While acquisition of the gun and drugs was the prod-
uct of a search pursuant to warrant, it was not the fruit of the fact that the entry was not pre-
ceded by knock-and-announce.”). 
 56. Id. at 594-99. 
 57. See id. at 596 (“Of course even if this assertion [that without suppression there will 
be no deterrence of knock-and-announce violations at all] were accurate, it would not neces-
sarily justify suppression.”). 
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sion repeats the pro-police mantra: exclusion is a “massive remedy”58 that 
carries “substantial social costs.”59 
The opinion adds, however, another argument: Fourth Amendment re-
medies may have been inadequate when Mapp was decided in 1961, but 
those remedies are much stronger now.60  Justice Scalia pointed to the rec-
ognition of entity liability in Monell v. New York City Department of Social 
Services,61 the provision authorizing payment of attorney’s fees to success-
ful § 1983 plaintiffs,62 and the increasing professionalization of the po-
lice.63 
Like his predecessors on the Burger Court, Justice Scalia did not men-
tion two cogent and long-standing arguments against the cost-benefit anal-
ysis.  One is that the cost of lost convictions is attributable not to the exclu-
sionary remedy, but to the underlying Fourth Amendment right.64  If the 
police complied with constitutional standards, the evidence would never be 
discovered and the guilty would remain at large. 
In unusual cases, like the knock-and-announce cases, compliance with 
constitutional standards does not prevent the discovery of the evidence.  
The inevitable discovery exception covers these cases.  Whenever Fourth 
Amendment doctrine forbids evidence, there is a “cost” only if a current 
policy preference for unlimited law-enforcement is given priority over the 
constitutional preference for limiting law enforcement power. 
 
 58. Id. at 599 (“Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjusti-
fied.”). 
 59. See id. at 591. 
 60. See id. at 597 (“Mapp could not turn to Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for 
meaningful relief . . . .”).  Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), which determined that “[c]itizens whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 
federal officers” could bring suit, was decided ten years after Mapp. 
 61. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597 (Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), was decided seventeen 
years after Mapp). 
 62. See id. (Congress authorized recovery of fees in successful § 1983 actions in 1976). 
 63. Id. at 599 (“There have been ‘wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and 
supervision of police officers.’” (citing SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CON-
TROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990, at 51 (1993))).  Dr. Walker, on whose 
work the court relied, subsequently protested that Justice Scalia had failed to appreciate the 
extent to which police professionalism is a product of the exclusionary rule. See Samuel 
Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at M5: 
Scalia’s opinion suggests that the results I highlighted have sufficiently removed 
the need for an exclusionary rule to act as a judicial-branch watchdog over the po-
lice. I have never said or even suggested such a thing. To the contrary, I have ar-
gued that the results reinforce the Supreme Court’s continuing importance in de-
fining constitutional protections for individual rights and requiring the appropriate 
remedies for violations, including the exclusion of evidence. 
 64.  See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (Cal. 1955) (“This contention is not 
properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the constitutional provisions themselves.”). 
DRIPPS CHRISTENSEN 6/13/2010  8:41 PM 
2010] THE “NEW” EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 753 
In a minority of cases, exclusion costs the public a conviction the police 
might have achieved later without violating the Fourth Amendment.  When 
police have probable cause but don’t bother getting a warrant, or when they 
search an automobile with less than probable cause but later learn of infor-
mation that would have gotten them over that hurdle, we can say that the 
exclusionary rule, rather than the Fourth Amendment, caused the loss of the 
evidence.  Most of the time, however, the police never could have made a 
case without violating the Fourth Amendment; the inevitable discovery ex-
ception again covers many of the cases where they might have done so.65 
The second familiar argument Justice Scalia ignored is related to the 
first.  Any effective remedy for Fourth Amendment violations will carry 
those same “substantial social costs.”66  Justice Scalia seems to be in a cel-
ebratory mood in writing about damage actions and police professionalism, 
as if searches that don’t take place because of the threat of tort liability or 
departmental discipline are somehow different from searches that don’t 
take place because of the threat of exclusion. 
These points have been in the literature since the 1920s.67  If they were 
bad arguments we would expect exclusionary rule critics to acknowledge 
them and reply.    Anyone who was a fair-minded critic of the exclusionary 
rule who had such a rejoinder would surely have deployed it. 
The claim that modern tort suits and modern police departments have 
made the exclusionary rule unnecessary reflects the same prejudice against 
the exclusionary rule.  Legal recognition of municipal liability is both diffi-
cult to establish68 and practically irrelevant.  Cities and police departments 
typically pay for the defense of claims against individual officers and in-
demnify the officers after a settlement or a plaintiff’s verdict.69  In 1976, 
 
 65. See Dripps, supra note 17, at 12 (“[B]ecause the very great majority of crimes are 
not cleared by arrest there is good reason to doubt that perfect police work would have se-
cured convictions in very many of those few cases lost to suppression motions.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 66. See, e.g., id. at 19 (“They would, however, carry the downside of effective deter-
rents: they would cause many crimes to go unexposed, foster police perjury to defeat liabili-
ty, and might chill officers from conducting justified but borderline searches and seizures.”). 
 67. See Connor Hall, Letters of Interest to the Profession, Evidence and the Fourth 
Amendment, 8 A.B.A. J. 646, 647 (1922) (“If punishment of the officer is effective to pre-
vent unlawful searches, then equally by this is justice rendered inefficient and criminals 
coddled.  It is only by violations that the great god Efficiency can thrive.”). 
 68. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 
263 (2000) (“Occasionally, localities can be sued directly under § 1983 and held liable 
without proof of fault, but the circumstances are very limited.” (footnote omitted)). 
 69. See id. at 267 (“[G]overnments routinely defend their officers against constitutional 
tort claims and indemnify them for adverse judgments.”). 
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Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), authorizing attorney’s fees for suc-
cessful plaintiffs.  There is no correlative provision for Bivens actions.70 
The practically relevant rules for damage actions against the police thus 
have not changed for more than thirty years.  If there has been a change, it 
has been cultural rather than legal.  Marc Miller and Ron Wright’s survey 
of reported settlements of suits against police presents persuasive evidence 
that the police can be sued successfully.71  Previous empirical work, how-
ever, indicated that recoveries against the police would be substantial pri-
marily when the police had inflicted physical injuries, especially when the 
police acted in bad faith.72  As Wright and Miller point out, the secrecy of 
settlements means that we can only speculate about the nature of the 
claims.  My own suspicion is that most of the settlements reported by 
Wright and Miller involved claims based on Tennessee v. Garner73 or Gra-
ham v. Connor,74 not illegal stops, arrests, or auto searches. 
The inability of the Hudson majority to find a single successful tort suit 
for violation of the knock-and-announce rule is illustrative. 
2. Herring 
The Court characterized the issue in Herring v. United States as whether 
evidence found in a search incident to an arrest, based on an erroneous po-
lice record of an outstanding arrest warrant, should be suppressed.75  The 
same Justices that composed the Hudson majority held that the evidence 
 
 70. See Margot Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1631 n.253 
(2003) (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) applies only in § 1983 actions; Equal Access to Justice Act ap-
plies only to suits against the United States or officers in their official capacities, thus ex-
cluding Bivens actions). 
 71. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of 
the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757 (2004). 
 72. See id. at 767 (“The largest cases tend to involve serious physical injuries or sexual 
misconduct by officers.  The bigger payments also occur when officers act based on racial 
prejudice or some personal hostility to the plaintiff.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 73. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding the fatal shooting of a non-dangerous suspect to be un-
reasonable seizure). 
 74. 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (holding that excessive force by police can establish a Fourth 
Amendment violation supporting suit for damages). 
 75. The actual facts are less sanitary. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698.  
Investigator Anderson was willing to phone around the state looking for a reason to give 
Herring a toss.  By strange coincidence he received oral notification of an outstanding war-
rant, actually rescinded but that “for whatever reason” was not recorded as rescinded.  Od-
dly enough, the timing simply forced the good officer to arrest Herring not on the sidewalk, 
but in his truck, which could be searched incident to arrest.  If pretextual arrests were 
crimes, there would be reasonable suspicion, if not indeed probable cause, against Investiga-
tor Anderson. See id. 
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should be admitted.  Speaking this time through the Chief Justice, the Court 
deployed the Calandra cost-benefit analysis, and concluded that: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deli-
berate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable 
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.  As laid 
out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, 
or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or sys-
temic negligence.  The error in this case does not rise to that level.76 
In a footnote to this passage, the majority engaged the dissenters as fol-
lows: 
We do not quarrel with Justice Ginsburg’s claim that “liability for negli-
gence . . . creates an incentive to act with greater care,” and we do not 
suggest that the exclusion of this evidence could have no deterrent effect.  
But our cases require any deterrence to “be weighed against the ‘substan-
tial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule,’” and here exclusion is 
not worth the cost.77 
In this revealing passage, the majority agrees that suppression would 
prevent future violations of the Constitution, but characterizes prevention 
of constitutional violations as not worth the loss of a single case against a 
hoodlum so dysfunctional that he cannot drive to the impound lot without 
his contraband. 
Two dissenting opinions quite cogently challenged the majority’s gener-
al deterrence analysis78 and the extension of the Leon-Evans line of cases to 
records maintained by the police.79  These points, however, accept the basic 
Calandra framework.  All four of the dissenters, Justices Ginsburg, Ste-
vens, Breyer, and Souter, also endorsed a direct attack on that approach. 
Echoing earlier dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan and Justice Ste-
vens, and the views of Professor Yale Kamisar, Justice Ginsburg argued 
that exclusion serves purposes other than deterrence and is an integral 
component of the substantive constitutional right.80  That view is examined 
more closely (and critically) in Part III.  For present purposes it suffices to 
 
 76. Id. at 702 (citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 702 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The [majority’s] suggestion runs counter to a 
foundational premise of tort law—that liability for negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates 
an incentive to act with greater care.”). 
 79. See id. at 711 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Distinguishing between police recordkeeping 
errors and judicial ones not only is consistent with our precedent, but also is far easier for 
courts to administer than” the majority’s approach).  Justice Breyer’s reading of the case law 
is supported in Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s 
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009). 
 80. See id. at 70-08 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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say that the exclusionary rule is back, but unchanged since the 1980s.  A 
bloc of five Justices regards compliance with the Fourth Amendment as a 
cost and exclusion as accordingly disfavored, while a bloc of four dissen-
ters would sever the exclusionary remedy from deterrence calculations and 
tether it instead to the underlying substantive right. 
In my view, both blocs are wrong.  The next two parts of this Article ex-
plain why.81 
II.  NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE 
OVERDETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS 
A. The Overdeterrence Concept 
Remedies for the violation of legal rules optimally deter when potential 
violators rationally expect the violation to have a value of zero.82  If viola-
tions can be expected to return net gains, the rule will be violated even 
when compliance would be possible at lower net cost.  If the regulated ac-
tors rationally anticipate the value of violations to be negative, they will re-
frain from borderline but legal conduct with positive benefits, or adopt pre-
cautions that cost more than the value of the violations they prevent. 
The standard tort model has some plausibility as applied to suits against 
the police.  Given the prevalence of defend-and-indemnify arrangements, 
cities or police departments are repeat players estimating the benefits and 
costs of their agents’ behavior with respect to a large pool of cases.  In 
many of the cases in the pool, the legality of police action will be uncertain 
ex ante.  So overdeterrence and underdeterrence are both possible.  The po-
lice could avoid all Fourth Amendment violations by playing pinochle in 
the station house, and they could uncover a lot of evidence by searching on 
mere suspicion or en masse.  Society favors neither extreme, and this looks 
a lot like how we think about industries that cause some harm but confer 
great benefits, like mining, transportation, power generation, and so on. 
The difficulty in applying the optimal-deterrence prescription to search-
and-seizure is that there is no symmetry between the gains the regulated ac-
 
 81. Part II of this article is a revised and expanded version of a paper originally pre-
sented at the Lexis-Nexis Criminal Procedure Forum held at Emory University School of 
Law in December 2008 (i.e., post-Hudson, but pre-Herring), and published with the other 
symposium papers as Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, 
and the Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypo-
thesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209 (2010). 
 82. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
537, 554 (2005) (“The efficient level of care is the amount at which the marginal cost of 
care equals the expected marginal cost of an accident.”). 
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tors secure from violations and the cost of those violations.  Such symmetry 
is thought to exist in tort law, where damages are set so that the tortfeasor’s 
damages equal the value of the plaintiff’s loss, with punitive or pain-and-
suffering damages thrown in to account, very roughly, for the reality that 
the probability of a successful suit, even in meritorious cases, is less than 
one. 
When the police kill or injure the victim, tort damages can be estimated 
just as the tort system estimates damages for wrongful death or personal in-
jury in other cases.  Even here, however, there is good reason to doubt that 
damage actions achieve optimal deterrence of unlawful police violence.  
The qualified-immunity defense means that police violence incurs liability 
only when clearly excessive.  The police employer therefore does not ex-
pect to internalize the costs of every illegal police shooting or beating, with 
corresponding incentives to train and discipline the force.  There are politi-
cal incentives at work as well, but those may work in favor of aggressive 
policing as well as against it.  Police immunity gives reason to doubt 
whether we are optimally deterring even police violence. 
Damage actions, however, offer the only practical remedy for police 
misconduct not motivated by the desire to initiate a formal prosecution.  
The exclusionary rule does not deter police who beat up citizens for sport.  
If we abolish qualified immunity (which was as unknown to the founders 
as the exclusionary rule83), we might come closer to optimal deterrence.  
The risk, however, is that the prospect of liability might induce the police 
to refrain from violence even when justified, leading to the escape of dan-
gerous felons.  The immunity defense was created to prevent this very con-
tingency.84 
 
 83. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 208-15 (“If 
[the defendant] admits the fact [of a trespass], he is bound to shew by way of justification, 
that some positive law has empowered or excused him.” (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 
Howell’s St. Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765))).  Reasonableness might mitigate damages, but 
it would not negate liability.  Blackstone says: “the law . . . determines the quantum of that 
satisfaction, by considering how far the offence was wilful or inadvertent, and by estimating 
the value of the actual damage sustained.” Id. at 209.  Thus in Wilkes v. Wood, Wood had 
relied on the warrant issued by the Secretary of State, but was nonetheless found liable in 
trespass for damages of £1000, a huge sum for the time. See 19 Howell’s St. Trials 1154 
(C.P. 1763). 
 84. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1408  (2007) (“[A]ny attempt to extend damages liability to the case of 
borderline error runs headlong into the judicial rationale for qualified immunity.  In no other 
context is the problem of overdeterrence—more precisely, the problem of unintended deter-
rence of legitimate acts—more keenly felt.”).  Contrary to Professor Slobogin’s suggestion, 
see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 363 (1999), good-faith immunity does not eliminate the possibility of overdeter-
rence.  If the expected sanction is severe enough, the risk that the agency or court might er-
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The exclusionary rule influences police behavior in the pool of cases in 
which the objective of the search or seizure includes enabling a formal 
prosecution.  Strictly speaking, the victim of an unlawful search who is 
prosecuted may both suppress the evidence on the criminal side and sue the 
officers on the civil side.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld so called 
plea-bargain/release agreements, in which the search victim waives civil 
remedies as part of a plea deal.85 
Typically, however, exclusion operates in cases where damage actions 
face formidable valuation problems.  We can perhaps estimate the employ-
er’s benefit from the government’s willingness to pay tens of thousands per 
year to incarcerate the guilty and the added expense of the police force it-
self.  Any such calculation will typically dwarf the economic damage from 
unlawful stops, searches, and even arrests.  Guessing about liquidated dam-
ages runs the risk of overdeterrence. 
The Hudson majority supposes that this remedial mix of damage actions, 
limited by qualified immunity, and the exclusionary rule, is overdeterring 
Fourth Amendment violations.  To unpack the overdeterence hypothesis, 
we should begin with a normative point.  Knowing violations of the Consti-
tution cannot be justified by police calculations of costs and benefits.  Sup-
pose police have probable cause to believe that a murder weapon can be 
found in a particular house, but they have no warrant to search.  Suppose, 
further, that they know the house to be temporarily unoccupied.  Entry, 
therefore, would disturb no one.  Now suppose that the residents have left a 
window open, so that the police could enter without doing any damage to 
property.  The police have no warrant, but they are confident one would be 
issued if they applied for one.  They are also confident that their depart-
ment would cheerfully pay whatever a tort suit might cost to make a major 
case.  Exclusion gives them an incentive not to enter and search the house; 
is this overdeterrence? 
The Supremacy Clause says no.  Presumably the compelling-state-
interest safety valve applies in Fourth Amendment cases, so that if cata-
strophic consequences would follow from compliance with the usual con-
stitutional rules, the police might disregard those rules without violating the 
Constitution.  This is analogous to Congress enacting a law authorizing 
censorship of the news in wartime, the text of the First Amendment not-
withstanding.  If, however, we leave the compelling-interest scenario aside, 
 
roneously find the violation to be knowing, rather than in good faith, might deter many justi-
fied police interventions.  A damage remedy limited to compensation, coupled with good 
faith immunity (basically the current § 1983 system, even if applied by an agency), avoids 
overdeterrence only by tolerating substantial underdeterrence. 
 85. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). 
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the police should do exactly what the exclusionary rule encourages them to 
do—get a warrant, even if this means that the evidence may disappear be-
fore it can be seized. 
The same normative analysis applies to searches permitted by the Con-
stitution without warrants, but only on condition of probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion.  Suppose a thousand cars are parked by a valet service 
for a Rolling Stones concert.  The police could, at negligible cost, seize the 
keys from the service and search every vehicle.  Does the Fourth Amend-
ment permit them to balance the costs of search against the value of evi-
dence, or does it rather balance those values independently of current poli-
cy preferences by requiring probable cause? 
The position I am defending is different from the claim that the Fourth 
Amendment establishes a property rule rather than a liability rule.86  I have 
tried over the years to conceptualize the Fourth Amendment as a liability 
rule or a property rule, but the private-law dichotomy does not easily trans-
pose to a constitutional limit on the public force.  Indeed, because the prop-
erty/liability distinction turns on remedies rather than rights, the variety and 
controversy over Fourth-Amendment remedies renders the private-law dis-
tinction problematic in this context.  Rather, the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects particular individual interests against government encroachment ab-
sent specified prerequisites.  This substantive rule is protected by a mix of 
remedies.  Egregious violations are punishable both criminally87 and by 
punitive damages.88  Ongoing violations can be enjoined,89 even when un-
dertaken in good faith based on legal advice.90 
Professor Kontorovich makes a useful point by distinguishing slow-
moving from fast-moving Fourth Amendment events.91  Obviously enough, 
 
 86. The seminal authority for this proposition is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Me-
lamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).   In his debate with Professor Kamisar about the exclusionary 
rule, infra note 180, Judge Calabresi made no use of the property/liability construct, which 
tends to support the point in text. 
 87. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (reviewing the sentence im-
posed following the conviction of the police officers accused of the Rodney King beating, 
which was recorded on videotape). 
 88. See, e.g., Wilson v. Aquino, 233 F. App’x 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding a punitive 
damage judgment for an illegal body-cavity search). 
 89. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (enjoining the search of 
hundreds of homes based on arrest warrants for two individuals). 
 90. For example, suits challenging road block policies and drug testing programs are 
typically framed as pleas for injunctive relief.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 91. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis to Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1178-79 (2005) (distinguishing 
warrant-clause cases from reaonableness-clause cases, and arguing that latter cannot be liti-
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in most cases, Fourth Amendment violations can be remedied only ex post, 
typically by exclusion, damage actions, or both.  To say that ex post reme-
dies are the only ones we have is not to say that the sanction for violations 
should equal either the victim’s loss or the violator’s gain, because in the 
Fourth Amendment context these are different. 
There may be violations for which damages provide the best practical 
remedy, but those damages are not, and should not, be limited by compen-
sation; rather, they should be set high enough to eliminate all but irrational 
incentives for violation.  Private law abhors holdouts and eccentrics.  The 
Fourth Amendment protects them.  The government has no more right than, 
say, Bill Gates to break into houses or lock people up with a cheerful wil-
lingness to pay damages ex post. 
What makes some knowing violations of the Fourth Amendment look at-
tractive is the failure of substantive doctrine to factor the seriousness of the 
suspected offense into the determination of reasonableness.  Professor 
Stuntz has criticized the transsubstantive character of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.92  Prevailing doctrine might be justified by the tendency of 
judges to consider offense severity in practice.  However one resolves the 
transsubstantive issue, the issue is one of substantive, rather than remedial, 
law. 
In the Fourth Amendment context, then, overdeterrence does not mean 
that the monetized expected value of evidence that might be found from il-
legal searches exceeds the expected damages to be paid for those 
searches.93  The substantive constitutional provision has balanced the costs 
 
gated ex ante so that the Fourth Amendment should be understood as a liablity rule).  I find 
this analysis unsatisfying.  For one thing, administrative searches are analyzed under the 
reasonableness clause, not the warrant clause, but are typically tested by suits for injunctive 
relief, as in the drug testing and roadblock cases.  More fundamentally, the property/liability 
dichotomy does not tell us whether to choose compensatory or deterrent measures for sanc-
tions ex post.  In, for example, a police homicide case like Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 
(1985), the only feasible remedy is ex post.  It does not follow that the amount of damages 
should be compensatory rather than punitive. 
 92. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001). 
 93. Writing in 1982, Judge Posner took the view criticized in the text.  Assuming that a 
search would enable a conviction society values at $10,000, and that $100 would be ade-
quate compensation for lost privacy and the costs or repair, 
[t]he much larger “fine” that is actually imposed will overdeter, causing the gov-
ernment to steer too far clear of the amorphous boundaries of the fourth amend-
ment compared to what it would do at the optimal fine level. The lawful searches 
that are forgone and the convictions of the guilty which those searches would have 
produced are social opportunity costs that the lower fine would have avoided. 
Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 
57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638 (1982) [hereinafter Posner, Excessive Sanctions].  This seems 
wrong because the substantive constitutional provision excludes utility from prohibited 
DRIPPS CHRISTENSEN 6/13/2010  8:41 PM 
2010] THE “NEW” EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 761 
and benefits of those searches quite differently. Overdeterrence of constitu-
tional violations, therefore, means discouraging lawful police actions in a 
pool of cases where the legality of prospective actions is uncertain. 
The Hudson majority is therefore wrong to characterize the loss of relia-
ble evidence as the “substantial social costs” of the exclusionary rule.  Jus-
tice Roberts’s smug reference to the prominence of prior dissents in Justice 
Ginsburg’s Herring opinion94 would make a better point if prior majority 
opinions spoke to the argument that they were treating violations of the 
Constitution as desirable and compliance with the Constitution as a cost.  
As those opinions stand, the Chief Justice appears to take comfort in the 
frequency with which this error has been repeated. 
However we enforce them, limits on police power facilitate crime.  
There should be no blinking of the fact that freedom and safety do conflict.  
A free society will have more crime than a police state, and crime is un-
doubtedly a “substantial social cost.”  That cost, however, is properly 
charged to freedom itself.95  Were it not for the Fourth Amendment, ple-
 
practices, just as the criminal law excludes utility from contraband.  Writing in 1999, Judge 
Posner took a different and, to my mind, more persuasive approach: 
Yet most [exclusionary rule critics] do not argue that the misconduct should be 
condoned or redefined as proper conduct; they merely advocate the substitution of 
other sanctions that would not involve excluding the fruits of the illegal search. If 
the substitute sanctions were effective in deterring the misconduct, there would 
not be any fruits, and so there would be no net gain from the standpoint of accura-
cy in adjudication. Instead, the critics should be advocating either that the standard 
for determining whether a search is illegal should be redefined, and specifically 
that searches should be deemed illegal only if the evidentiary benefits do not equal 
or exceed the costs of the search to the victim; or that the only sanction for an il-
legal search should be a suit for compensatory damages. The latter approach 
would require the police, in effect, to “buy” the fruits of their “illegal” searches 
from the victims, which they presumably would do when the evidentiary benefits 
exceeded the costs to the victim of the search. 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 
1533 (1999).   “The latter approach” is an option only if the first approach is also taken, or if 
it is understood as the same approach, once again masking substance as remedial.  If the tort 
damages reflected a constitutional component in excess (traditionally very greatly in excess) 
of the cost of a cleaning crew and new hinges, tort suits that promised recovery of constitu-
tionally adequate damages would cause the loss of the very evidence now excluded. 
 94. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 n.2 (2009) (“Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
champions what she describes as a more majestic conception of . . . the exclusionary rule, 
which would exclude evidence even where deterrence does not justify doing so.  Majestic or 
not, our cases reject this conception and perhaps for this reason, her dissent relies almost 
exclusively on previous dissents to support its analysis.” (alteration in original) (internal qu-
otation marks and citations omitted)). 
 95. Ironically, the Hudson majority is very much on board with Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),  a decision with more blood on it in five years than Mapp has on it 
in nearly fifty. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. 
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nary search powers might very well prevent some of the very worst 
crimes—terrorist attacks like those of 9/11 or the repeated incidents of 
rape, torture, and murder perpetrated behind closed doors by the likes of 
John Wayne Gacy or Leonard T. Lake.  Were it not for the Fourth 
Amendment, plenary search powers certainly would make the production 
and distribution of cocaine, heroin, and child pornography on an industrial 
scale much more difficult.  We retain, indeed revere, the Fourth Amend-
ment in spite of these horrific consequences. 
The Fourth Amendment is one of those civil liberties the United States 
has fought its wars to establish and preserve.  General warrants and the 
writs of assistance were among the grievances inspiring revolution.96  
Sweeping search and arrest powers were a necessary component of the 
odious southern slave apparatus.97  The Second World War and the Cold 
War (including the shooting wars in Korea and Vietnam) were waged with 
the object of preventing the global hegemony of aggressive police states.98  
In the latter struggle, the United States stood ready to use nuclear weapons 
against cities.99  In the former struggle, it actually did so.100 
If the Fourth Amendment is worth waging war, it is worth tolerating 
crime.  We can be grateful that sophisticated policing and pragmatic doc-
trine keep that cost as low as it is.101  We should not, however, sugarcoat 
 
REV. 747, 772-73 (2005) (“In Dallas County, Texas, judges are dismissing up to a dozen 
domestic violence cases per day because of evidentiary problems related to Crawford.”). 
 96.  See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (resentment against writs of assistance and general warrants was “so deeply felt by 
the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution”). 
 97.  See, e.g., ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HIS-
TORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1789-1868, at 106-225 (2006). 
 98.  See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, United States of America, Address to 
Congress (Four Freedoms Speech) (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.americanrhetoric. 
com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm (decrying the “new order of tyranny” and stating that 
“[t]he American people have unalterably set their faces against that tyranny”). 
 99.  See, e.g., NORMAN POLMAR & JOHN D. GRESHAM, DEFCON-2: STANDING ON THE 
BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR DURING THE CUBAN MISSLE CRISIS (2006). 
 100.  See, e.g., RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 734 (1986) (“More 
recent estimates place the number of deaths [from the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima] 
up to the end of 1945 at 140,000.  The dying continued; five-year deaths related to the 
bombing reached 200,000.”); id. at 740-42 (“70,000 died in Nagasaki by the end of 1945 
and 140,000 altogether across the next five years, a death rate like Hiroshima’s of 54 per-
cent.”). 
 101. Cf. Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime 
Rates: Mapping out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 174 
(2003) (finding through an empirical study based on FBI Uniform Crime Reports data in 
pre-Mapp-no-exclusion and pre-Mapp-exclusion states that “Mapp increased crimes of lar-
ceny by 3.9%, auto theft by 4.4%, burglary by 6.3%, robbery by 7.7%, and assault by 
18%”).  When confronted by the finding that states that adopted the exclusionary rule on 
their own decreased the crime rate, the authors freely speculate about self-selection. See id. 
DRIPPS CHRISTENSEN 6/13/2010  8:41 PM 
2010] THE “NEW” EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE 763 
the facts.  The choice between freedom and security is tragic, in the sense 
that however a political community makes that choice, some innocent 
people will suffer terribly as a result.  In our political community we have 
made that choice, as irrevocably as we can, against an unlimited commit-
ment to security.  Loose references to lost evidence as a “cost,” made with-
out reference to the constitutional judgment that the better course is not to 
gather all possible evidence of crime, should be banished from the law and 
from the literature as the veiled attacks on the Constitution that they are. 
If we take the substantive Fourth Amendment law as given and worthy 
of content-independent respect, it follows that the police should be trained 
to refrain from searches and seizures whenever the proposed action is more 
likely than not illegal.  The reverse is not true; the police may often gain an 
advantage by delaying a stop, search, or arrest for some time after they 
have established legal grounds.  The current remedial mix would overdeter 
if, and only if, the police have a net incentive to refrain from searches and 
seizures for other than tactical reasons, even when the potential action is 
probably legal. 
B. Police Incentives 
Police behavior on the street is the product of a long sequence of agency 
relationships.  Voters elect a municipal government, the government estab-
lishes a police force, and the administrators in charge of the force train its 
officers and reinforce this training by rewarding compliance and punishing 
noncompliance.  A brief look at the relationship between officers on the 
street, whose conduct is the actus reus of any Fourth Amendment violation, 
suggests that the focus of policy analysis should be on police administra-
tors. 
Individual officers do not internalize either the benefits or the costs of 
Fourth Amendment activity.  When the police apprehend an offender, they 
may improve their performance evaluations and gain prestige within the 
 
at 171.  It is no more of a reach to speculate about self-selection in other ways.  For exam-
ple, law-and-order states that did not exclude before Mapp might have been the first to make 
narcotics an urgent priority shortly thereafter.  Prioritizing drug offenses draws police re-
sources away from reported crimes to unreported ones.  If this switch took place faster after 
Mapp in states that had not had the exclusionary rule hitherto, all the data would show is the 
effect of an exogenous change in law-enforcement taste. 
The basic point, however, should not be lost.  Any method of enforcing legal limits on 
the police will cause some victimization of innocent people—including some murders.  Put 
another way, how should we characterize the Atkins and Rubin numbers?  Do they reflect 
the high price of Warren Court activism?  Or do they reflect the marginal benefits of lawless 
policing, including midnight entries, pumping stomachs, planting microphone in private 
bedrooms, and indefinite detention incommunicado on suspicion—all, of course, without 
warrants? 
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force.  They do not, however, pocket what the community is willing to pay 
to prosecute and punish the offender. 
Nor do individual officers internalize the costs of Fourth Amendment ac-
tivity.  The police get paid whether or not they are deployed to their highest 
use.  If police seize evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
evidence may be suppressed, but the police are not automatically fined or 
jailed.  Although the practice is somewhat subterranean, cities and depart-
ments apparently pay for the defense of lawsuits against individual officers, 
and, when the individuals are liable, indemnify the individual officers for 
the cost of damages or settlements.102  Individuals, therefore, do not inter-
nalize (nor do they expect to internalize) these costs.103 
So the law influences street-level behavior primarily by giving police 
administrators incentives to train and discipline the force to comply with 
constitutional requirements.  Call whomever is in charge of the police, the 
employer, R.  Let us assume that R is a rational actor with an incentive to 
maximize measurable indicia of crime control (arrests, clearance rates, 
convictions, reductions in reported crimes, maybe even victimization sur-
vey numbers).  Let us further assume that R is obligated, by contract or 
custom, to defend and indemnify employees against civil rights actions. 
Built into this model is an important and nonobvious assumption.  The 
model assumes that R has no content-independent respect for law.  If R has 
a taste for complying with formal legal prescriptions, R will train and dis-
cipline the force to be more compliant than the model predicts.  The as-
sumption is debatable but in my view justified by the available informa-
tion.104 
 
 102. See Jeffries, supra note 68, at 267. 
 103. See id. (“[I]n cases of flagrant misconduct (of the sort that might trigger criminal 
prosecution), a government might cut its employee loose, but it is hard to imagine a case of 
simple search and seizure (unaccompanied by assault or other grievous harm) provoking 
that reaction.  Thus, although government officers cannot capture the social benefits of their 
actions, neither do they pay the full costs.”). 
 104. The political incentives facing public officials responsible for the police are dis-
tinctly tilted in favor of security over liberty.  I remain convinced of the basic soundness of 
the position I advanced in Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the 
Theory of Public Choice, OR:  Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the 
Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993).  For a more recent resume of the supporting 
arguments, see Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for 
the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 145-50 (2005).  Professor Rosenthal, 
in distinguishing public from private liability-based incentives, seems to agree that sanctions 
that might be optimal from the perspective of a private firm may be inadequate to ensure 
constitutional compliance by public entities. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Govern-
mental Damages Liability: Tort, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
797, 842-43 (2007) (“Even aside from political opportunity costs, liability-producing con-
duct may have political benefits that offset the deterrent effect of liability. To use Professor 
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R will train and discipline the force NOT to act unless: 
EB ≥ EC 
where EB is R’s expected benefit from action and EC is R’s expected cost.  
EB, the expected benefit, can be broken down into nonevidentiary benefits 
(“NEB”) and evidentiary benefits (“EVB”).  NEB includes such gains as 
discouraging crime by visible patrol presence or preventing domestic vi-
olence by arresting the abusive boyfriend.  EVB includes the gain from 
enabling prosecutions based on evidence expected from a prospective ac-
tion. 
EC can be broken down into opportunity cost (“OC”) and liability cost 
(“LC”).  Once the funds are appropriated to pay for the force, the cost of 
those funds is fixed.  The force itself, however, can be deployed in different 
ways.  Police engaged in routine patrol could be working undercover drug 
operations or gang investigations.  The size of OC depends on the expected 
benefits from the next-best-use (“NBU”) that might be made with the quan-
tity of resources (“QR”) devoted to any given operation. 
R has an incentive to deploy the force to its highest uses measured by 
whatever crime-control measures R adopts.  The next-best use for marginal 
police resources is the value of R’s highest unmet priority—which is small 
enough that given R’s budget constraint, that priority is not addressed at all.  
The size of OC therefore depends to some extent on whether the police face 
a target-rich or target-poor environment.  OC will be greatest when a police 
operation consumes large resources in a target-rich environment, and smal-
lest when the operation consumes modest resources in a target-poor envi-
ronment. 
The primary effect of the exclusionary rule is to reduce EVB.  If the po-
lice are certain that a proposed search will be held legal, EVB is un-
changed.  If the police are certain that it will be held illegal, EVB is re-
duced to zero.  In uncertain cases, if evidence is found, there will be a 
probability of exclusion; call it PX.  The effect of the exclusionary rule is to 
multiply EVB by (1-PX). 
The risk of exclusion also changes the opportunity cost term, because 
one cost of a search is the risk that the evidence will be discovered at a time 
when the police lack probable cause or reasonable suspicion but could have 
established it later had they delayed and sought additional supporting in-
formation.  This cost—the normatively relevant cost of exclusion—is re-
duced, but not eliminated, by the inevitable discovery exception.  The in-
 
Levinson’s example, a program of aggressive stop-and-frisk of young males in high-crime 
areas may increase liability, but it also may pay such handsome political benefits that liabili-
ty will have no deterrent effect.” (citation omitted)). 
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evitable discovery exception requires proof by a preponderance that the 
tainted evidence would have been found later and lawfully but for the pre-
mature police intervention.105  In some cases the evidence would have been 
found later and lawfully but the prosecution will not be able to prove this.  
This cost is genuine, but given the inevitable discovery exception, and the 
readiness of judges to make the required finding, I will treat it as negligi-
ble.106 
So viewed, the exclusionary rule is less a penalty for police illegality 
than a bounty for legality.  This bounty can influence police behavior be-
cause the opportunity costs and liability risks of action may outweigh the 
nonevidentiary benefits but not the total benefits of action.  The exclusio-
nary rule reduces the expected evidentiary benefit, in direct proportion to 
the probable unlawfulness of the prospective search or seizure. 
LC has two components, the probability of damages (“PD”) and the 
quantity of damages expected (“QD”).  We can now describe the incentives 
facing R by the equation: 
NEB + (EVB * (1 - PX) ≥ (QR * NBU) + (PD * QD) 
The police should act only when they expect the gains, discounted by the 
risk of exclusion, to outweigh the opportunity cost plus the risk of damag-
es. 
The present remedial mix would be overdeterring if PX, PD, and QD are 
high enough to eliminate the expected net benefit from searches that are 
probably legal and otherwise cost-beneficial according to R’s utility func-
tion.  If this were true, we would expect the police to refrain from justifia-
ble but borderline searches, by choosing to intervene only when the legality 
of their actions is highly probable.  I think this hypothesis can be tested 
against empirical evidence on the success rates of different types of 
searches. 
Fourth Amendment law’s primary requirement is of some level of ante-
cedent suspicion.  Searches for evidence can only be justified by probable 
cause.  Investigative stops can only be justified by reasonable suspicion.  If 
we could agree on numbers for probable cause and reasonable suspicion, 
and knew the success rates the police were encountering in a large sample 
of cases, we would have some evidence bearing on the overdeterrence hy-
pothesis.  If hit rates were substantially higher than the prescribed level of 
antecedent probability, police would be refraining from high-probability 
searches. 
 
 105. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 106. See Dripps, supra note 17. 
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It might be the case that hit rates are so high that the likely explanation 
would be that police action was limited not by the legal rules but by re-
source constraints.  That seems implausible.  Clearance rates for the index 
crimes are in the vicinity of 20%.107  That suggests a target-rich environ-
ment (a high rate of offenses relative to police resources), but also that the 
targets are not easy to hit.  Police searching at random would not discover a 
great deal of evidence.  If hit rates are high, it is because OC and LC are 
high relative to NEB and (EVB * 1 - PX). 
C. Testing the Overdeterrence Hypothesis 
Has the current remedial mix had a chilling effect on police actions that 
are probably legal?  This seems improbable, both from the incentives 
created by the current mix and from what direct evidence we have of police 
behavior.  When police action is of debatable legality, the immunity de-
fense insulates the officer from liability, and thereby the employer from in-
demnification.  Exclusion reduces but does not eliminate the value of bor-
derline actions, as police administrators probably derive considerable utility 
from seizing drugs and weapons even if these may not be used in court. 
The exceptions to exclusion of tainted evidence are one reason.108  The 
standing rule in particular means that the police can rationally anticipate 
some legal benefit from illegal searches when group criminality is sus-
pected.  When the police illegally seize contraband, the drugs or guns are 
off the streets even if they cannot be used as evidence.  Many, probably 
most, arrests are made with no expectation of discovering evidence in the 
incidental search. 
If the adjudication of suppression motions frequently resulted in false 
positives—erroneous findings that the police had acted illegally—exclusion 
might discourage borderline but lawful actions.  If errors are distributed 
randomly, however, police administrators would expect false positives to 
be balanced by false negatives.  In all probability, false negatives are more 
likely than false positives.  Sympathetic judges and police perjury reduce 
the probability that evidence illegally seized in fact will be so ruled in 
court. 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 146 (2005); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investi-
gation, 2008 Crime in the United States, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/ 
offenses/clearances/index.html. 
 108. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 84, at 1407 (“One suspects that many courts in 
many places strain to avoid [exclusion in border-line rather than flagrant cases].  Yet it is 
precisely in the context of the borderline mistake, the everyday close call that should have 
been made differently, that alternative remedies are hardest to find.” (citations omitted)). 
DRIPPS CHRISTENSEN 6/13/2010  8:41 PM 
768 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
This assessment of the legal incentives facing police decision-makers is 
consistent with the most plausible empirical test of over or underdeterrence.  
The literature contains a considerable number of studies measuring the suc-
cess rates of different types of searches and seizures.  We can compare the 
“hit rate” with the level of antecedent suspicion the law requires for each 
species of search and seizure. 
If the hit rate is clearly above the legally-required zone of ex ante proba-
bility, in a large sample we could infer either very high opportunity costs (a 
police force so small relative to offenses that it can process only high-
probability cases, quite aside from remedies for legal violations), or over-
deterrence (the police have the capability to engage in high-probability 
searches but refrain because of the fear of exclusion and damages).  If, by 
contrast, the hit rate is clearly below the legally-required zone of ex ante 
probability, we could infer either very low opportunity costs (the police 
have so many resources relative to offenses that only low-probability cases 
are left to pursue), or underdeterrence (the police engage in lots of low-
probability, and thus unlawful, searches, because the benefits of even low-
probability cases exceed the costs). 
Prior exclusionary rule research, and more recent research on racial pro-
filing, has given us some evidence of the hit rates for search warrants for 
private premises, warrantless vehicle searches during traffic stops based on 
probable cause under United States v. Ross109 and California v. Acevedo,110 
and Terry stops111 of citizens on the streets.  The evidence is not as exten-
sive as one might wish, but it is evidence, as distinct from mere conjecture 
of the sort set forth by the Hudson majority.  Let us look at what we know 
about warrant searches, warrantless automobile searches, and Terry stops. 
1. Warrant Searches 
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to issue search war-
rants.  The Supreme Court has resisted quantifying probable cause,112 but 
 
 109.  456 U.S. 798, 804-25 (1982) (holding that where a police officer had probable 
cause to believe that an automobile contained narcotics, the officer could open a paper bag 
in the trunk of the car without first obtaining a warrant). 
 110.  500 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1991) (holding that where a police officer had probable 
cause to believe that a paper bag in the trunk of a suspect's auto contained marijuana, the 
police officer could open the paper bag without first obtaining a warrant). 
 111. This term comes from the case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which held per-
missible a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer where he 
has reason to believe that the individual is armed and dangerous, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. Id. at 27. 
 112. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is 
incapable of precise . . . quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities 
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the governing idea in the cases is that probable cause is present when the 
expected probability of success exceeds 50%, while a lower probability 
may sometimes suffice.  The Supreme Court has read the Amendment to 
require warrants for some searches, primarily entry of homes without con-
sent. 
The warrant requirement increases OC because, aside from the collec-
tion of the information showing probable cause, the preparation of the ap-
plication and the process of presenting the application to a judge consume 
significant amounts of police time.113  Search warrants have little NEB; po-
lice applying for a warrant are motivated by the desire to obtain admissible 
evidence.  We should therefore expect that the police will seek warrants on-
ly when EVB is high—above the rough-and-ready 50% hit rate that would 
satisfy the probable cause standard. 
In 1972, Michael Rebell studied search warrants executed in a Connecti-
cut jurisdiction in two different years and found that 64% and 70% of the 
warrants resulted in the seizure of some of the target evidence.114  A study 
for the National Center for State Courts examined warrant practice in seven 
cities and found that the success rate for warrant searches, based on returns 
filed listing some of the target evidence seized, in six of the seven cities 
studied, ranged from 74 to 89%.115  More recently, Laurence Benner and 
Charles Samarkos’s study of search warrants issued by state courts in San 
Diego found that 65% of the executed warrants authorizing searches for il-
legal drugs resulted in the seizures of the target evidence.116 
 
and depends on the totality of the circumstances. . . . ‘[T]he substance of all the definitions 
of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’” (citations omitted)).  In the 
leading case, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Court equated probable cause 
with a “fair probability.”  One might argue the reverse—that “less likely than not” can be 
equated with “improbable,” and therefore no probability at all.  On the other hand, in Prin-
gle the majority shied away from any numerical expression of required probability.  Proba-
bly the best that can be said is that the probable cause standard is “a relatively high level of 
certainty akin to a more-likely-than-not standard . . . .” Christopher Slobogin, Transaction 
Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 150 (2005). 
 113. See Donald A. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 926-27 (1986). 
 114. Michael A. Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: The 
Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 723 (1972). 
 115. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 46-50 (1983).  These percentages were obtained by taking the 
percentage of searches in cases in which returns were filed that led to seizure of some item 
named in the warrant, and multiplying that percentage by the percentage of warrants for 
which returns were in fact filed. 
 116. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: 
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 
249 (2000). 
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Warrant searches succeed at a rate that matches or exceeds the hit rate 
prescribed by the applicable legal standard.  Does this suggest overdeter-
rence?  Probably not.  The numbers for success have not changed dramati-
cally since Leon, even if the quality of the applications may have suffered.  
Since Leon and Malley v. Briggs,117 a defective warrant, absent gross ig-
norance or deliberate perjury on the part of the police, will trigger neither 
exclusion nor damages.  The likely explanation for the high rate of success 
for searches pursuant to warrants is opportunity cost.  Quite aside from the 
remedial mix of damages and exclusion, which have been withdrawn from 
warrant searches absent the most egregious facts, police who seek and ex-
ecute warrants are interested in evidence and generally have probable 
cause. 
If we view the warrant requirement solely as a means to the end of ascer-
taining probable cause in the most rational way, hit rates over 50% would 
indeed suggest overdeterrence.  There is, however, no exception to either 
the substantive right, or the exclusionary remedy, when police act without a 
warrant even though probable cause is clearly present.  It would seem to 
follow that the warrant process has additional purposes, including that of 
putting a costly hurdle between the police and the most sensitive Fourth 
Amendment interests—the privacy of the home and of confidential com-
munications.118 
The remedial mix enters the warrant context by framing the opportunity 
cost issue.  Why would the police bother with the costly warrant process?  
Because the remedial mix makes bypassing warrants too costly.  Search 
warrants are usually sought for home invasions (electronic surveillance is 
another common object).  Absent consent or exigency, which the courts 
have been pretty scrupulous about with respect to home searches, the police 
know that home invasion requires a warrant.  Judges facing a motion to 
suppress for a warrantless home search are willing to suppress and may feel 
no real choice about the matter.  Citizens whose homes have been invaded 
may well bring suit, and police who enter homes without warrants are not 
likely to win on the immunity defense. 
So it is not implausible, but all things considered probably incorrect, to 
say that the success rate for warrant searches should be near the 50% num-
ber the probable cause standard might suggest.  To the extent that the 
Fourth Amendment requires the police to get warrants based on probable 
cause, the constitutionally-prescribed hit rate is higher than what we would 
 
 117. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 118. See Stuntz, supra note 92, at 848 (“[R]equiring a warrant is a good thing if, but only 
if, the substantive standard applied to the search would otherwise be too low—if, that is, 
police will be too quick to search unless they are forced to get a warrant.”). 
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expect if the Fourth Amendment required only probable cause.  The war-
rant requirement adds the cost of the warrant process to the requirement for 
home invasions, not just as a matter of police tactics but as a matter of the 
Fourth Amendment’s constitutional trump over ordinary policy considera-
tions.  Given the legal requirement of both probable cause and a (costly) 
warrant, we should expect the hit rates from warrant searches to be some-
what above the 50% threshold—which is where it turns out that they are.  
Only if the costs to police of obtaining warrants were reduced to zero 
would we expect the hit rate to be 50%. 
If hit rates for warrant searches are thought too high, the curtailment of 
both exclusionary and damage remedies for searches authorized by war-
rants suggests that the “culprit” is the cost of the warrant process.  Action 
to reduce that cost to the police might move the hit rate closer to the 50% 
rate we might expect from a perfect assessment of probable cause ex ante. 
Abolition of the exclusionary rule means that the police would enjoy the 
full evidentiary benefit of illegal warrantless home invasions.  There are 
two possible scenarios.  If the specter of tort liability is strong enough, 
nothing would change.  No extra evidence will be discovered (and so much 
for the exclusionary rule’s social costs!).  If, however, admissibility of the 
evidence changes the balance of incentives so that the risk of tort liability is 
deemed worth the cost of a search that both the training department and the 
executing officers know is illegal, evidence will be obtained but only by 
treating the Constitution as unworthy of content-independent respect. 
Both scenarios would play out.  When the police expect the search vic-
tim to lack the means, the pluck, or the equities predictive of success in tort 
to actually sue, warrantless home invasions, à la Mapp, would flourish.  
Evidence of crimes by the wealthy, well-educated, and politically-
connected would be just as inaccessible to justice as with the exclusionary 
rule. 
2. Warrantless Searches 
Under Ross and Acevedo, police need probable cause, but no warrant, to 
search vehicles for evidence or contraband.  Prior to the racial profiling 
controversy, warrantless searches were hard to study.  Police executing a 
warrant are obligated to make a return to the court, creating a documentary 
record.119  No such record typically accompanies a warrantless search.   
Now, however, we have some data on auto searches, developed to ad-
dress the controversy over racial profiling.  Much of this data concerns the 
initial decision to stop, rather than the later decision to search.  When hit 
 
 119.  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(D). 
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rates for stops are reported, the search might be based on consent, or as in-
cident to arrest, rather than as a free-standing search for evidence based on 
probable cause.  It is difficult to parse the data to find hit rates for this par-
ticular species of police behavior. 
Sam Gross carefully analyzed data collected by the Maryland State Po-
lice.120  The officers were required to report traffic stops and subsequent 
searches, and to identify when the search was based on consent.  Treating 
all nonconsent searches as based on a claim of probable cause, Gross found 
the hit rate for these latter searches to be just under 48.4%.121  Again, at 
least superficially, that is about where the law says it ought to be. 
Gross points out that there are two reasons to think that the Maryland da-
ta overstate the hit rate, perhaps dramatically.  First, the police disliked the 
reporting requirement, and were, one supposes, far more likely to report 
hits than misses.122  Second, when the data are parsed for the importance of 
the evidence seized, the overall hit rate is far less impressive.  If we factor 
out trace and personal quantities of marijuana, the hit rate for Maryland 
probable-cause searches drops to 9.8%.123 
Of course possessing marijuana for personal use is a crime.  It is not, one 
supposes, what the police were looking for.  A bigger reason to discount 
the hit rate, however, follows from the fact that in many cases probable 
cause for the vehicle search is derived from discovery in plain view (or 
plain smell) of a personal supply of marijuana.  In these cases the search 
shows up in the overall statistics as a hit, even though the probable-cause-
based search discovered nothing at all. 
If the primary mission of the police who make traffic stops is traffic en-
forcement, the opportunity cost of the time added to each stop by a tho-
rough search of the vehicle is high.  Traffic violations are ubiquitous; the 
state gains revenue from citations and the police have incentives to issue 
those citations.  In a study of the North Carolina State Police, William 
Smith and his colleagues found that troopers on patrol for speeding or other 
traffic infractions almost never searched and, moreover, were loath to do 
so.124 
 
 120. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug 
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002). 
 121. Id. at 674 tbl.9. 
 122. Id. at 679 (“[Troopers] very likely did distort the records in these data by simply 
failing to report unsuccessful searches, a type of conduct that is also familiar from reports in 
New Jersey and New York.” (citations omitted)). 
 123. Id. at 700 tbl.14.  The 9.8% figure is obtained by adding the 3.7% hit rate for small 
dealers to the 6.1% hit rate for medium/large dealers. 
 124. WILLIAM R. SMITH ET AL., THE NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY TRAFFIC STUDY, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 157 (2003) 
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If, however, the primary police mission is drug interdiction, OC is lower.  
Undercover investigations to build a record for warrant searches are time-
consuming and dangerous.  Sell-and-bust operations are easier but net only 
ordinary users.  LC for the search, independent of the stop, is low.  Quali-
fied immunity means that liability attaches only to police who are clearly 
mistaken about the probable cause issue, and reasonable people can often 
disagree about whether probable cause is present or not.  Damages for an 
illegal roadside search are not likely to be high. 
Accordingly, for warrantless searches, the remedy with the most influ-
ence on police behavior is the exclusionary rule.  Gross’s numbers on their 
face suggest no overdeterrence.  Regarded realistically, however, they sug-
gest some degree of underdeterrence. 
3. Terry Stops 
Under Terry v. Ohio125 and its progeny, the police may detain a suspi-
cious person for investigation if they have what the cases call “reasonable 
suspicion” to believe he is engaged in criminal activity.  If the courts have 
been reluctant to quantify probable cause, they have been even less willing 
to quantify reasonable suspicion.  The officer is said to need “a reasonable 
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot 
. . . .’”126  An anonymous tip corroborated only by police observation of in-
nocent details in the tip falls short of this standard.127  Presence on the 
streets in a high-crime neighborhood, coupled with flight from the police 
on sight, is enough.128  If the police are justified in stopping the suspect, 
they may conduct a protective pat-down search for weapons if specific 
facts are present to suggest that the suspect might be dangerous. 
The opportunity cost of these street encounters is relatively low.  The 
police are still present on the street, and if they hear gunfire or someone 
shouting “Stop, Thief!” they can abandon their speculative encounter and 
address the emergency.  At the scene of their deployment they produce the 
nonevidentiary benefits of a visible patrol presence, but unless they actually 
stop people they will have no evidentiary gains, unless they see an offense 
 
(“The regular road troopers we talked to were not enthusiastic about searches in the least, 
and it is clear that they view unnecessary searches, in general, as a nonproductive use of 
their time.”). 
 125. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (finding permissible a reasonable search for weapons for the pro-
tection of the police officer where he has reason to believe that the individual is armed and 
dangerous, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime). 
 126. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 
 127. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000). 
 128. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
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in flagrante.  From a crime-control standpoint, they have an incentive to 
stop and frisk the most suspicious person in the area, regardless of just how 
suspicious that individual happens to be. 
Liability risk for Terry stops is also low.  Because the governing law is 
expressed as a standard (“reasonable suspicion”) rather than a rule (no en-
try of private premises without a warrant, consent, or emergency), the qual-
ified immunity defense protects all but the most egregious violations.  
Damages from an encounter measured in minutes are not likely to be large.  
So, as with warrantless searches, the primary incentive to comply with the 
reasonable-suspicion standard is the exclusionary rule. 
If the police have enough evidence ex ante to make an arrest, they have 
no need for the Terry procedure.  There is a small probability that the sus-
pect will admit criminal activity.  While there may be some crime-control 
benefit from hassling suspected gangsters in public view or dissuading the 
suspect from a planned but never consummated offense, a major reason for 
these stops is the prospect of discovering drugs or guns.  The exclusionary 
rule’s role here is definite but limited.  If the police act unlawfully they 
may lose their case, but the drugs or guns will still be off the streets. 
Like warrantless searches, Terry stops were hard to study before the ra-
cial profiling controversy.  The controversy has generated considerable da-
ta about police practices, but it is difficult to gauge the extent of police 
compliance with constitutional standards.  For example, reviewing police 
records to determine the presence of reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause reveals the limitations of the records themselves.  Using this ap-
proach, the New York Attorney General’s office estimated that in a sample 
of more than 15,000 recorded Terry stops, 15.4% of the records failed to 
establish legal grounds, and another 23.5% left unclear the legality of the 
police actions.129  It has been pointed out, however, that police often have 
more information than time and energy to report, implying that in many 
cases adequate grounds were present but unrecorded.130 
Direct observations of police behavior can squarely address the frequen-
cy of constitutional violations.  Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski con-
ducted an observation study of police search practices in a medium-sized 
 
 129. CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND FRISK” PRACTICE: A REPORT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 160-62 (1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/civil_ 
rights/pdfs/stp_frsk.pdf. 
 130. See James J. Fyfe, Stops, Frisks, Searches, and the Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 379, 393 (2004) (“Whether and how many of these stops were, in fact, unconsti-
tutional, is a question that will never be resolved.”). 
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city.131  They identified 115 searches and coded them as constitutional or 
unconstitutional, with doubtful cases evaluated by a committee composed 
of one former judge and two former prosecutors.  Gould and Mastrofski 
concluded that thirty-four (30%) of the searches were illegal, and that in 
thirty-one of these cases the suspect was neither arrested nor cited, so that 
the case would never enter the criminal justice system.132  Of the 115 
searches in the sample, forty-four were pat-downs under Terry and seventy-
one were “full searches” or searches for evidence.  Twenty (45.5%) of the 
pat downs were deemed illegal, as were fourteen (19.7%) of the searches 
for evidence.133 
This approach, however, also has at least two weaknesses.  The first is 
that it is time-intensive and therefore costly, meaning that limited sample 
sizes may not produce representative results.  Gould and Mastrofski, with a 
substantial team and a National Institute of Justice grant, generated a sam-
ple of merely 115 cases from a single jurisdiction.134  The second is that in 
at least some cases, reasonable observers may disagree about the legality of 
the police actions.135 
This Article’s focus on hit rates has its own limitation, i.e., the legality 
of a stop or a search does not depend on the result.  Hit rates, however, 
have two advantages.  We now have access to some large samples of data, 
and hit rates are more objective than professional opinions about legality.  
Since compliance with the reasonable suspicion standard in a large pool of 
cases would limit the hit rate, hit rates offer an important item of evidence 
in measuring compliance. 
Using a larger sample of the reports reviewed by the New York Attorney 
General’s Office, a recent RAND study of more than 500,000 reported Ter-
ry stops by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”)136 found that only 
 
 131. Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Beha-
vior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315 (2004). 
 132. Id. at 331-32. 
 133. Id. at 333. 
 134. See Fyfe, supra note 130, at 390 (suggesting a “replication of Gould and Mastrofs-
ki’s work in an agency in which officers are more carefully trained and held accountable . . . 
.”).  To their credit, Gould and Mastrofski addressed this problem, both by coding according 
to certainty of legality/illegality, and by opting to code as legal in indeterminate cases.  It is 
therefore possible that their estimate of 30% noncompliance is low, rather than high. See 
Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 131. 
 135. See Fyfe, supra note 130, at 384 (“This [research] group’s assessment of what was 
constitutional and what was not was only marginally better than that of the police who had 
been observed.”). 
 136. GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DE-
PARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES xi (2007). 
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10% of these stops resulted in either an arrest or a citation.137  The NYPD 
employs a particularly aggressive version of community policing, and so 
we might expect the New York City hit rate to be uncharacteristically low.  
If, however, we are interested in the influence of Fourth Amendment reme-
dies, then we are similarly interested in how far an aggressive police de-
partment feels it may go before the costs exceed the gains.  The NYPD 
must therefore believe that neither the exclusionary rule, nor the tort reme-
dy, eliminates the net benefits resulting from Terry stops with a 10% hit 
rate.  The reporting requirement that made the New York data possible, 
moreover, increases OC for stops.  We might well expect the hit rate to be 
lower in jurisdictions with comparable police tactics but no reporting re-
quirement.  Unless reasonable suspicion means something like an outside 
chance, the remedial mix is underdeterring illegal Terry stops. 
The RAND data shed some interesting light on the frisk part of stop-and-
frisk.  The data show that the police frisked only a minority, roughly one-
third, of those stopped.138  This may be a reporting artifact, but that seems 
improbable given that in the other two-thirds of these cases the police took 
the time to fill out the form recording the stop itself.  The hit rate for these 
frisks is quite low, with the recovery of some contraband occurring in 5.4-
6.4% of frisks.139  The numbers vary a bit across racial groups, but, roughly 
speaking, 1% of frisks across groups result in the recovery of a weapon.140 
Some contraband was recovered in 6.4% of frisks of whites, 5.7% of 
blacks, and 5.4% of Hispanics.141  The recoveries were primarily of drugs: 
“For every 1,000 frisks of black suspects, officers recovered seven wea-
pons, and, for every 1,000 frisks of similarly situated white suspects, offic-
ers recovered eight weapons, a difference that is not statistically signifi-
cant.”142 
What can we learn from these numbers?  The very low rate at which the 
police recover weapons stands to reason.  They face an immediate, person-
al, and potentially catastrophic cost if the suspect resorts to lethal resis-
tance.  The finding that the police are not frisking almost every suspect 
stopped is somewhat surprising.  In any event it seems that if the police do 
fear armed resistance, the exclusionary rule is unlikely to influence their 
behavior. 
 
 137. Id. at xv. 
 138. Id. at 37 tbl.5.2. 
 139. Id. at 41-42 & tbl.5.5. 
 140. Id. at 42 tbl.5.5. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at xiv. 
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The substantive law makes weapons but not drugs fair objects of the so-
called protective search.  If the exclusionary rule creates incentives that 
trump officer safety, overdeterring justified frisks for weapons, we would 
expect to see much higher hit rates for weapons.  The six- or seven-to-one 
ratio of drugs to weapons recovered might mean that the police often frisk 
the suspect not because they subjectively fear for their safety, but because 
they hope to discover illegal drugs. 
The hit rate suggests that in practice “reasonable suspicion” means about 
a one-in-ten chance of finding anything (and a dramatically lower chance 
of finding one of the weapons that theoretically justifies the “protective 
search”).  This might reflect either of two causes.  One is that in ruling on 
suppression motions, the judges, generally following the Supreme Court’s 
guidance, are willing to accept very little in the way of particularized suspi-
cion.  If, for example, in the case Florida v. J.L.,143 the police had added to 
the anonymous tip a furtive gesture or evasive movements by the suspect, 
and characterized the locale as a high-crime neighborhood, a suppression 
motion would very likely have failed. 
If the 10% hit rate (with much lower hit rates once open-container alco-
hol and personal-use marijuana violations are excluded) is really consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s stop-and-frisk jurisprudence, the exclusionary 
rule is working fine in this context.  It should be recalled, however, that 
when Indianapolis police set up road blocks to stop every vehicle, wholly 
without individualized suspicion, to perform canine examination and so-
briety checks, the hit rate was 9%.144  If “reasonable suspicion” means 
something more demanding, the low hit rate in stop-and-frisk cases may be 
due to the prominence of nonevidentiary reasons for aggressive patrol tac-
tics, and/or judicial reluctance to drop the exclusionary hammer. 
The J.L. case is again illustrative.  Whatever happened in court, officers 
who get an anonymous tip that a kid is carrying a gun onto a city bus are 
likely to intervene.  If no weapon is found, practical liability risks are next 
to zero.  If a weapon is found, it will be confiscated even if it is later sup-
pressed.  And even if “reasonable suspicion” is dubious, if a weapon is 
found the courts may very well admit the evidence too.  In J.L., the Florida 
trial court granted the suppression motion, but the state appellate court re-
versed.145  The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the 
evidence should have been suppressed, but two dissenters urged an excep-
 
 143. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 144. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000). 
 145. J.L., 529 U.S. at 269. 
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tion that would make a conclusory anonymous tip reasonable suspicion 
when the tip alleges the possession of a firearm.146 
If the first explanation, that “reasonable suspicion” is an undemanding 
standard, is correct, the exclusionary rule might be achieving close to op-
timal deterrence in stop-and-frisk cases.  If the second explanation is cor-
rect, the empirical evidence suggests under, rather than overdeterrence. 
4. Police Brutality 
The worst forms of unconstitutional police misconduct—police brutali-
ty—have no EVB and so the exclusionary rule has no direct disincentive 
effect.  Brutality does have a relatively high LC.  There is enough police 
brutality to doubt that the tort sanction is overdeterring it (recall that when 
illegality is certain there is no risk of overdeterrence).  “The national aver-
age among large police departments for excessive-force complaints is 9.5 
per 100 full-time officers.”147  However one regards the present 
tort/crime/discipline remedial mix for police brutality, the exclusionary rule 
debate is largely irrelevant to the brutality problem.  Abolition might signal 
carte blanche to the police and thereby encourage brutality by implication.  
In a rational actor model, however, abolition of the exclusionary rule would 
not change training or discipline with respect to police violence. 
5. Arrests 
As with police brutality, the exclusionary rule has little to do with police 
incentives.  Evidentiary benefit is no consideration at all in most arrests.  
Arrests are infrequently an instrument of investigation and far more often 
the end-stage product.  In theft cases, and buy-and-bust drug cases, the po-
lice hope to find incriminating evidence at the time of arrest.  But the bulk 
of arrests reflect other police incentives. 
Warrants for nonappearance are a substantial fraction of arrests.  In fla-
grante arrests, whether for purse-snatching, public intoxication, or solicita-
tion of prostitution, are another substantial percentage.  Arrests to suppress 
immediate violence, especially domestic violence, are yet another signifi-
cant fraction.  From a departmental perspective, the expected value of ar-
rests is almost all nonevidentiary.  Either the police already have the evi-
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Susan Saulny, Chicago Police Abuse Cases Exceed Average, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2007, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/us/15chicago.html.  Some 
complaints are false; but many citizens decline to complain because they expect no action or 
fear reprisal. 
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dence they need, or the arrest is made for social control purposes other than 
initiating a prosecution in court. 
The exception is the so-called pretextual arrest, where the police make 
an arrest because they have broader search powers incident to the arrest 
than they have based on the probable cause or reasonable suspicion stan-
dards.  In these cases, rules that clearly limit the scope of the search inci-
dent tend to discourage pretextual arrests when the suspected evidence is 
outside the permitted zone of search, and to encourage pretextual arrests 
when the suspected evidence is in that zone. 
The predicate arrest must be based on probable cause, but no warrant is 
required except when the police need to force entry into private premises to 
effect the arrest.  We can look to case attrition studies—studies of “lost ar-
rests”—to see how many arrests end in conviction, and thereby construct a 
sort of “hit rate” for arrests.  While the figures vary from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction, the figure generally accepted is that half of all arrests result in a 
conviction and half do not.  The most recent numbers are a little lower than 
that.148  That sounds very much like probable cause. 
Whether too high, too low, or just right, current case attrition figures 
probably are not due to the Fourth Amendment remedies mix.  Tort liability 
for false arrest is part of the cost side of the equation, but drastically limited 
by qualified immunity.  In some atypical cases—drug cases and perhaps a 
few others—the police hope to discover some evidence incident to the ar-
rest, and in these cases the exclusionary rule may have some influence as 
well.  If this remedial mix were over-deterring we would expect to see sub-
stantially lower case attrition rates, i.e., we would expect the police to con-
centrate resources in cases where probable cause is clear rather than border-
line.  It seems more likely that Fourth Amendment remedies have 
negligible influence on arrests, and that police behavior is explicable large-
ly in terms of opportunity cost. 
When the police apply for an arrest warrant as part of an ongoing inves-
tigation, the opportunity cost, in terms of lost police time, resembles that of 
obtaining a search warrant, but is generally smaller.  Bench warrants are 
not sought by the police, and in any event most arrests are not authorized 
by warrant ex ante.  The opportunity cost of an arrest is the time it takes for 
 
 148. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2004, the most recent data available, 
there were 1,100,210 arrests for selected serious felonies in the state systems, but only 
466,480, or just over 42%, resulted in convictions. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Sta-
tistics Online, tbl.5.0002.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t500022004.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2010).  The Table lists the offenses differently; I generated my number by 
summing the arrests and convictions across all offenses listed. 
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the police to find, subdue, and transport the offender before handing him 
off to the court system’s lockup and write a report. 
The opportunity cost of search warrants is measured in days.  The oppor-
tunity cost of an arrest is measured in fractions of an hour but is still signif-
icant.  If arrest serves neither immediate social control purposes, nor in-
itiates a promising prosecution, police administrators have reasons to train 
the force to remain at work on proactive patrol or investigating reported of-
fenses. 
6. Summary of the Evidence on the Overdeterrence Hypothesis 
The evidence available suggests that the current remedial mix is doing a 
passable job with respect to home invasions, where the rule-type warrant 
requirement forces the police into the costly warrant process.  The evidence 
further suggests that, when the opportunity cost for unlawful searches or 
seizures is low, the current mix is not adequately deterring unlawful police 
actions governed solely by standards like probable cause or reasonable sus-
picion.  This should concern civil libertarians, but there seems little cause 
to criticize the current remedial mix for discouraging lawful searches and 
seizures. 
The Hudson majority’s concern with the exclusionary rule’s “substantial 
social costs” is at odds with the overdeterrence thesis.  Perhaps most telling 
is the frequency with which the courts rely on exceptions to the exclusio-
nary rule to admit evidence obtained in violation of constitutional require-
ments.  If the tort sanction were deterring such violations, the exclusionary 
rule could not exact those “substantial social costs,” and there wouldn’t be 
a great deal of tainted evidence available under exceptions to exclusion.  
There wouldn’t be many Fourth Amendment violations to support suppres-
sion motions.  A judiciary that wanted to eliminate the exclusionary rule 
without encouraging violations of the Constitution would not do so de jure, 
but de facto, by crafting effective alternative remedies that make exclusion 
too rare to care about. 
That course, exemplified by eliminating the judge-made qualified im-
munity defense, really does run the risk of overdeterrence.  Given the pre-
valence of indemnification of individual officers, and the Supreme Court’s 
extensive recognition of bright-line rules, tort liability sans immunity and 
sans exclusion might move us closer to optimal deterrence.  Given the dis-
connect between tort damages and the expected gain from aggressive polic-
ing, we would also have to consider the possibility that such a regime 
would either underdeter (if, for example, low damages for arbitrary Terry 
stops gave police general search powers of citizens on the streets) or over-
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deter (if extravagant juries brought back awards high enough to discourage 
the police from acting in all but clearly legal cases). 
III.  RIGHTS-BASED THEORIES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Justice Ginsburg dissented in Herring.  She argued that the exclusionary 
rule was necessary to deter negligent record-keeping by the police.  More 
momentously, she criticized the deterrence-based cost-benefit analysis the 
Court has followed since Calandra.  Justice Ginsburg embraced a “more 
majestic” understanding of the exclusionary rule, an understanding that 
calls for suppression even when there is little reason to expect deterrence of 
future Fourth Amendment violations. 
Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, and Justice Souter joined Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion, so the Calandra approach now hangs by a thread.  A 
change of view by one of the Justices in the Herring majority, or a change 
in the composition of the Court, could produce a majority that favors Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s approach.  Her approach therefore deserves careful analy-
sis. 
That is less easy than it sounds, because Justice Ginsburg’s Herring dis-
sent is both exceptionally brief and vague about just what this “majestic” 
view entails.  The Herring dissent devotes only four paragraphs to criticiz-
ing the Calandra approach.  The first paragraph, quoting Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Arizona v. Evans, declares that the Fourth Amendment “‘is a 
constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its 
agents.’”149 
The second paragraph, quoting Potter Stewart, characterizes exclusion as 
“‘a remedy necessary to ensure that’ the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions 
‘are observed in fact.’”150  After a citation to a prominent article by Yale 
Kamisar,151 this paragraph goes on: “The rule’s service as an essential aux-
iliary to the Amendment earlier inclined the Court to hold the two insepar-
able.”152  The paragraph ends with a “see” citation to Whiteley v. Warden153 
and a “cf.” citation to the famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in 
Olmstead v. United States.154 
 
 149. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 150. Id. (quoting Stewart, supra note 12, at 1369). 
 151. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 600 (describing Weeks as approving the view that loss of 
evidence is attributable to the Fourth Amendment rather than to the exclusionary rule). 
 152. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 153. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
 154. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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The specific citation to Whiteley is to pages 568-69, where the Whiteley 
Court concluded that when police act in reliance on a wanted bulletin from 
other police, the arresting officers lack probable cause if the officers is-
suing the bulletin lack probable cause and the arresting officers learned 
nothing new before the arrest.155  The only reference to the exclusionary 
rule is this sentence: “Therefore, petitioner’s arrest violated his constitu-
tional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; the evidence 
secured as an incident thereto should have been excluded from his trial,” 
followed by a boiler-plate citation to Mapp.156  This does not appear to add 
anything to the integration/unitary transaction view announced in the first 
paragraph. 
The references to Brandeis and Holmes are even more puzzling.  Justice 
Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead followed the then-controlling Boyd 
case.  Boyd held that the Fourth Amendment forbade any seizure of private 
papers, and that the Fifth Amendment forbade the use of illegally-seized 
papers as evidence against their owner.157  The issue in Olmstead was 
whether private telephone conversations, illicitly intercepted, should be 
treated like papers.  Justice Brandeis said that they were, in famous lan-
guage.158  But Boyd is dead. 
Justice Ginsburg, presumably, is not calling for the return of Boyd.  In 
Justice Brandeis’s view, Boyd calls for holding unconstitutional any—
repeat, any—surreptitious electronic surveillance for law-enforcement pur-
poses.159  In any view, Boyd prohibits any seizure of private papers, even 
 
 155. Id. at 568-69. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 158. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pur-
suit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings 
and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life 
are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by ci-
vilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained 
by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.”). 
 159. Entick had held that the common law knew no warrant to search for mere evidence, 
and Boyd had held that a court order compelling production of private papers, obtained after 
adversary process, violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  Brandeis viewed private 
conversations as on a par with private papers (if not yet more sacrosanct), and thus beyond 
surveillance even under warrant.  Note the inclusion of papers compelled “in the orderly 
process of a court’s procedure,” id. at 477-78, as within the rule of Boyd, and the inflexible 
conclusion of the famous right-to-be-let-alone passage that any use of the conversations in 
evidence violates the Fifth Amendment. 
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under warrant, unless the papers qualify as fruits, instrumentalities, or con-
traband.  And while Boyd was understood to protect nontestimonial physi-
cal evidence (once again immune from seizure even pursuant to a valid 
warrant), Boyd did not protect tools, fruits of crime, or contraband.  An ex-
clusionary rule based on Boyd therefore would not reach guns or drugs, the 
very evidence the Herring dissenters would have suppressed. 
Justice Holmes dissented separately in Olmstead.  Holmes supported the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and himself had detached it from the 
self-incrimination privilege in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.160  
Silverthorne suppressed evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search of 
a corporation.  Corporations have no self-incrimination rights under the 
Fifth Amendment.  Holmes noted the point, but then declared that “the 
rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be pro-
tected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful 
way.”161  Silverthorne speaks both the language of deterrence (admissibility 
“reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words”) and judicial integrity 
(“The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a 
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before 
the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”).162 
Holmes took a clearer stand for judicial integrity in Olmstead.  Even if 
the Olmstead majority was right that wiretapping does not constitute a 
Fourth Amendment “search,” there was no doubt that the interception in 
that case was a crime under state law.  State prosecution therefore offered 
at least a theoretical alternative to exclusion for deterrent purposes.  With-
out endorsing Brandeis’s constitutional argument, Holmes endorsed a ver-
sion of the judicial integrity theory, as follows: 
For those who agree with me no distinction can be taken between the 
government as prosecutor and the government as judge.  If the existing 
code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty busi-
ness it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed.163 
 
Justice Ginsburg notably did not cite Justice Black’s opinion in Mapp, the last defense 
of the exclusionary rule on self-incrimination grounds to be found in the U.S. reports (and 
perhaps the last, period).  At that time, even those sympathetic to the exclusionary rule rec-
ognized the weaknesses of the self-incrimination theory. See Francis A. Allen, Federalism 
and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25-26 (noting his-
torical, analytical, and practical weaknesses of the self-incrimination theory, and expressing 
skepticism about the continuing relevance of Justice Black’s “individualism” on the issue). 
 160. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 161. Id. at 392. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Dropping the inapposite invocations of Whiteley and Brandeis, the 
second paragraph condenses to adding the authority of Holmes and Kami-
sar to the first paragraph’s announcement that the use of tainted evidence is 
itself forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.  The third paragraph makes a 
different, consequentialist argument.  Quoting Justice Brennan’s Calandra 
dissent, the Herring dissenters argue that exclusion “‘enabl[es] the judi-
ciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness,’ and it ‘as-
sur[es] the people—all potential victims of unlawful government con-
duct—that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus 
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in govern-
ment.”164 
Granting that if admission of the evidence necessarily implicates the 
court in a violation of the Fourth Amendment the court should refuse the 
evidence, what does this consequentialist point add to the case for the ex-
clusionary rule?  In a fascinating role-reversal, we see the defenders of civil 
liberties putting forth a sort of broken-windows type of deterrence argu-
ment.  If the courts approve Fourth Amendment violations, the moral mes-
sage will encourage illegal behavior by both police and citizens. 
Clearly enough this is an empirical claim, and similarly clear is that it is 
put forth as an article of faith rather than a proposition to be tested empiri-
cally.  Even those who endorse this sort of systemic deterrence idea, how-
ever, might well lose their faith when they consider that one consequence 
of the exclusionary rule has been the proliferation of police perjury.  No 
one can quantify it, but there is widespread belief that police not infre-
quently testify untruthfully at suppression hearings and that judges not in-
frequently credit (I do not say “believe”) their testimony.165 
If exclusion is thought to encourage police to turn square corners, and 
the most immediate reaction to this moral message is perjury, one might be 
inclined to rethink the sending of this moral message.  Likewise, citizens 
who see evidence admitted based on unlikely police testimony will be re-
ceiving a very different moral message than the one the Herring dissenters 
want to transmit. 
 
 164. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alte-
rations in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting)). 
 165. See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 80-81 (1992) 
(using a study conducted on Chicago policemen to illustrate higher instances of perjury in 
instances of Fourth Amendment violations).  Orfield also found that “[m]any respondents 
commented that to the extent a tort remedy would actually impose damages on police offic-
ers, it would cause the police to perjure themselves even more frequently.” Id. at 126. 
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At one point I took the view that police perjury reflected the failure of 
typical trial judges to meet the standard set by Holmes and Brandeis.  That, 
however, is an impossible standard to expect.  Given the judges we are 
likely to have, it is a fair point against the exclusionary rule that the release 
of an obviously guilty offender is so unpalatable that judges will resort to 
unsavory expedients to avoid that result. 
The final paragraph of the Herring dissent’s critique of Calandra tersely 
but correctly asserts the inadequacy of other remedies for Fourth Amend-
ment violations.  If we strip away the ghostly echoes of Boyd and the prob-
lematic moral-message argument, Justice Ginsburg’s case for a “more ma-
jestic” view of the exclusionary rule reduces to the argument that admitting 
tainted evidence should be regarded as forbidden by the same constitutional 
provision that prohibits the search. 
This position has distinguished defenders.166  It also has a variety of re-
lated weaknesses.  First, it does not speak to illegal searches or arrests that 
produce no evidence (to which, for simplicity, I will refer to as searches of 
the innocent, even though that label is not perfectly accurate).  Second, it 
does not account for alternative remedies, including the application of an 
exclusionary rule designed solely for deterrent purposes.  Third, all such 
theories seem inconsistent with the qualified immunity defense to tort suits 
against police for Fourth Amendment violations.  Fourth, unitary transac-
tion theories misunderstand the nature of the rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Begin with the case of the innocent search victim.  On a unitary-
transaction account, the courts are just as involved in an unfruitful illegal 
search as in a fruitful legal one, as the purpose of the search is to discover 
admissible evidence.  I assume that equity and integrity can be satisfied by 
something other than exclusion.  Otherwise the government would need to 
do something like offer innocent victims of illegal searches the right to pull 
pending indictments against third parties out of a hat to be dismissed.  If the 
government has done for the guilty whatever is enough to satisfy its duties 
to the innocent, there seems no reason to go further and suppress the evi-
dence against the guilty. 
 
 166. See TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 236-52 (Antony Duff 
et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that the integration principle, i.e., unitary transaction theory, and 
“moral standing of the trial” may call for excluding improperly obtained evidence); Kami-
sar, supra note 12, at 590-97 (advancing the principle of judicial review as a justification for 
exclusion); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary 
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 257-60 (1974) (characterizing 
search and use of evidence at trial as a “unitary transaction,” and defending the exclusionary 
rule as a necessary form of judicial review under Marbury v. Madison). 
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Suppose the police, without a warrant, consent, or exigency, break into 
the apartment of A and B.  In A’s bedroom they find nothing; in B’s bed-
room they find illegal drugs.  A’s only judicial remedy is a tort suit.  If that 
suit satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements for the innocent, why is it 
not enough for the guilty? 
The problem of innocent search victims necessarily leads to considera-
tion of alternative remedies.  To take an extreme example, suppose again 
that the police find illegal drugs during an illegal search.  Now suppose 
(this is counterfactual but illuminating) that the responsible officers have 
been charged criminally, convicted, and sent to prison before the court 
rules on the suppression motion.167  Has the government not done enough 
to cleanse its hands and dissociate itself from the unlawful search?  Has it 
not done enough to express its disapproval of its agents’ conduct?  It has 
done all it could do, if the defendant were innocent.  Must it do even more 
for the guilty? 
Familiar criminal-law principles of complicity suggest otherwise.  Sup-
pose A says to B: I will pay you $100 for every illegal weapon you turn in-
to me.  If, however, you steal the guns, or break into private premises for 
them, I will still pay you the money, but I will also prosecute the case to the 
fullest extent of the law.  If B commits a crime to collect guns for the buy-
back program, is A complicit?  If A is in earnest and credible, A neither in-
tends for B to commit the offense, nor, all things considered, encourages it 
or aids it. 
Up until Boyd in 1886, U.S. courts appear to have upheld the common-
law rule that illegality in the search or the seizure did not bar proof at a 
 
 167. This is the example alluded to in TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
TRIAL, supra note 166, at 228, as a reason for rejecting deterrent theories of exclusion.  As 
the authors state there, “when considering whether wrongfully obtained evidence should be 
excluded, the relevant comparator terms of deterrent effect is not failing to respond to the 
wrong, but rather using alternative sanctions for the wrong.” Id.  No explanation is later giv-
en why this is not also the “relevant comparator” for assessing judicial complicity in the 
prior illegality or the “moral standing of the trial.” 
One problem with deontological approaches is that they invite recharacterization of 
countervailing considerations as rights-claims.  Professor Pettys’s contribution to this Sym-
posium takes such a tack.  See Todd Pettys, Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument Against 
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 837 (2010).  I have grave 
doubt about whether this exceptionally creative turn is convincing, as it calls into question 
not just all exclusionary rules unjustified by reliability considerations (such as the rules 
against proof of subsequent remedial measures in civil cases, or proof of statements made 
during plea negotiations in criminal cases), but also seems to call into question settlements 
qua settlements, at least those entered into after the jurors are sworn.  I may have misunders-
tood Professor Pettys’s claim, but his article illustrates that those who recognize deontologi-
cal entitlements to exclusionary rules of evidence must also fend off claims of conflicting 
rights to truth in adjudication. See id. 
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criminal trial.168  Indeed, it was thought a point against exclusion that this 
would require going into a “collateral issue!”169  For the first ninety years 
of the Republic, search and use were not thought of as a unitary transaction, 
and judicial integrity was not thought to require rejecting tainted evidence 
in court.  Instead, what we think of as the “alternative” tort remedy was 
supposed to be the main, and quite adequate, relief for illegal search and 
seizure.  The atrophy of the tort remedy indeed requires some new remedy 
with deterrent power.  The claim that the Fourth Amendment itself requires 
exclusion as a natural or inevitable component, however, is a modern con-
trivance. 
Nondeterrent theories have a further weakness: they conflict with the 
qualified-immunity defense to tort actions under Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  Suppose in our initial hypo the police applied for a warrant, and a 
judge mistakenly concluded that the affidavit established probable cause.  
Suppose A, the innocent roommate, now brings suit, and the officers move 
for summary judgment, claiming the immunity defense.  If the court grants 
judgment for the defendant, as the law now requires, nothing will happen 
about the illegal search of A’s room.  The court will turn the innocent vic-
tim of a constitutional violation away from the courthouse.  If equitable 
principles or judicial integrity require suppressing B’s drugs, regardless of 
the consequences, they also point toward awarding A damages, regardless 
of the consequences. 
A robust tort remedy risks genuine overdeterrence.  So the immunity de-
fense is understandable;170 it is just not understandable from the standpoint 
of equity or judicial integrity. 
 
 168. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. 329, 337 (1841) (“There is another 
conclusive answer to all these objections.  Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials 
were illegally seized, still this is no legal objection to the admission of them in evidence.  If 
the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, 
the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the 
wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence, if they 
were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were.”). 
 169. Id. (“When papers are offered in evidence, the court can take no notice how they 
were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral issue to de-
termine that question.”). 
 170. See Posner, Excessive Sanctions, supra note 93, at 640-41 (“[T]he tort approach has 
its own problem of overdeterrence. . . .  We can fix this problem by immunizing police of-
ficers from tort liability, thereby externalizing some costs in order to eliminate a disincen-
tive for the police to produce external benefits.  But can we do this without also underdeter-
ring police misconduct?  We can—by ensuring that an officer’s immunity for misconduct 
(committed in good faith) is not extended to the agency employing him.”).  Judge Posner’s 
proposal, however, has not been adopted.  In practice, the police employer agrees to defend-
and-indemnify the individual officers, who do have qualified immunity to prevent overde-
terrence.  There is, however, no general rule of entity liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
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The final point, implicit in the first two, is that Fourth Amendment rights 
do not trump substantive laws against possessing drugs or weapons.  Again, 
suppose the police enter and search the apartment of A and B without a 
warrant.  Suppose the police find drugs in B’s room but not in A’s.  A and 
B sue the police for damages.  Should B’s recovery be higher than A’s?  
Surely his consequential damages are greater.  Yet it seems wrong on prin-
ciple to say that criminals enjoy greater Fourth Amendment rights than 
law-abiding citizens, or that the Fourth Amendment creates a constitutional 
right to commit murder in soundproof rooms.171 
Given that we do not return contraband, or increase damages for illegal 
searches that discover contrand, the exclusionary rule really is detached 
from the prior search.  The defendant is allowed to suppress because only 
in this way can the court protect the Fourth Amendment rights of persons 
unknown, who would suffer constitutional violations in future cases if the 
court received the evidence.  As in the classic third-party standing cases 
like Craig v. Boren or Barrows v. Jackson,172 assertion of the claim by the 
right-holder is impracticable.  The tort action has atrophied, and there is no 
sentiment in the court, or in legislatures, for revitalizing it. 
Deterrence is a perfectly sound explanation for the exclusionary rule.  
The emergence of professional police forces in the nineteenth century de-
pended on immunity from traditional tort liability, whether that immunity 
was recognized de jure or de facto.  With the atrophy of the trespass and 
false-arrest actions the founders had known, police behavior was virtually 
lawless.  The Fourth Amendment, like most constitutional provisions, says 
nothing about remedies.  If the federal courts have a duty to enforce a con-
stitutional provision, and no adequate statutory or common-law remedies 
exist, then the federal courts also have discretion to fashion an appropriate 
 
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).  If the individual officers are not personally 
liable, they owe no damages, and so the employer’s indemnification agreement requires no 
payment for damages. 
 171. If we are living in the ’80s, as this “new” debate suggests, I might as well repeat 
something I said then, and is no less true now: 
The evil of the search lies not in the discovery of criminal evidence, but in the 
concomitant exposure to the government, and thereby the world, of all those tell-
tales of personality revealed in any place we take for private. To view the exclu-
sionary rule as a personal right is to constitutionally enshrine the pistol in the 
basement or the cocaine in the coffee can, and to ignore as immaterial the music 
on the stereo, the books on the shelf, and the fading letters in the bedroom bureau 
drawer. 
Dripps, supra note 113, at 920-21. 
 172. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195-97 (1976) (allowing brewers to raise equal pro-
tection rights of consumers); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1953) (allowing 
white seller to invoke equal protection rights of black buyer while defending action on ra-
cially restrictive covenant). 
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mix of remedies.  Defenders of this view include Roger Traynor, Potter 
Stewart, and Anthony Amsterdam.  As we have seen, exclusion does en-
courage police compliance and, in all probability, does not overdeter in the 
normatively appropriate sense of the term. 
As Professor Amsterdam observed long ago,173 and Professor Alschuler 
noted in analyzing the causation issue in Hudson,174 deterrence is not in-
compatible with suppressing evidence that was obtained without violating 
the rights of the instant defendant.  Indeed, there need be no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment in the instant case at all.175  For deterrent purposes the 
correct inquiry into causation is prospective, not retrospective.  Target 
standing is just as logical as any other application of the exclusionary 
rule.176  Professor Amsterdam’s proposal to exclude drugs found during le-
gal frisks for weapons under Terry is doctrinally more radical but likewise 
a logical disincentive to illegal stops and frisks.177 
Overdeterrence again poses a countervailing consideration.  Suppose the 
government were required to dismiss fifty cases whenever the defense won 
a suppression motion.  This would deter like hell, and not all for the good.  
The government would then train the police force to avoid all but the most 
clearly legal searches. 
Consider another hypothetical case, this one based on Walder v. United 
States.178  Suppose the police arrest D without probable cause, and find il-
legal drugs on his person in the search incident to the arrest.  D successfully 
moves to suppress and the case against him is dismissed.  A year later, D is 
 
 173. See Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 437 (“[U]pon a proper regulatory view of the 
fourth amendment and its implementing exclusionary rule, there is no necessary relationship 
between the violation of an individual’s fourth amendment rights and exclusion of evi-
dence.”). 
 174. Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan 
and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1764 (2008) (“For more than forty years, the 
Court has denigrated ‘rights’ theories of the rule and contended that exclusion never vindi-
cates the interests of the defendant before the court.  The Court has insisted that exclusion is 
always what the Hudson Court said it never can be—a windfall awarded to a defendant for 
the sake of protecting the rights of others.”). 
 175. See Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 437 (suggesting “a rule excluding from evidence 
everything that an officer finds in the course of a ‘frisk’ except weapons” in order to discou-
rage frisks initiated for the subjective purpose of finding narcotics as opposed to weapons). 
 176. See People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (Cal. 1955) (“[I]f law enforcement officers 
are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of 
third parties, its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified.”).  Justice Traynor’s view was re-
jected by the U.S. Supreme Court, and later, by the California voters.  The Supreme Court, 
however, has adopted a theory of the exclusionary rule that comports with Justice Traynor’s 
argument for target standing, and has never satisfactorily answered his reasoning. 
 177. See Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 437. 
 178. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
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arrested after buying illegal drugs from an undercover agent.  D claims en-
trapment.  The government offers to prove predisposition with proof of the 
seizure the year before. 
In this case, the government already has lost one case against the defen-
dant and the defendant has not done anything wrong in defending the 
second case (unlike Walder, who perjured himself on the stand at the 
second trial by claiming that he had never had anything to do with drugs).  
Do equitable principles or judicial integrity require excluding the evidence 
in the second case?  My intuition is that there is no good reason to exclude 
the evidence in the second case. 
Another excellent test case is Calandra.179  Following the illegal search, 
Calandra was called to testify before a grand jury.  When he claimed Fifth 
Amendment immunity, the government issued a transactional immunity 
order.  He nonetheless asserted a Fourth Amendment right not to answer 
questions when the factual predicate for the questions was the prior illegal 
search.  Just as in Walder, the government lost the case that the tainted evi-
dence might have made.  Going further with exclusion would not have res-
tored the privacy lost during the illegal search, nor would it have discou-
raged subsequent violations. 
We have the exclusionary rule not because it is a necessary remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations, but because it is the possible remedy with 
the least combined risk of underdeterrence and overdeterrence.  Many re-
medies, like liquidated punitive damages, could deter (and satisfy other re-
medial objectives such as judicial integrity), but only at the risk of overde-
terrence.  Other remedies can be modified to avoid overdeterrence, but only 
by making them toothless (the immunity defense to tort suits is illustrative). 
In search-for-evidence cases, exclusion comes tolerably close to setting 
the government’s expected gain from illegal searches at zero, and thus ra-
tionally mediating the risks of over and underdeterring.  This account is 
convincing, so far as it goes, but it neglects the liberal critique of the exclu-
sionary rule for being less effective than a statutory alternative and for en-
couraging judges to twist both the facts and the law to avoid freeing the 
manifestly guilty.  The traditional exclusionary rule is not optimally deter-
ring warrantless police actions with low opportunity costs, such as viola-
tions of the stop-and-frisk rules under Terry v. Ohio.  This reinforces criti-
cisms of the exclusionary rule made by those to the left of the Hudson and 
Herring majorities, such as Judge Calabresi180 and Professor Slobogin.181  
 
 179. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
 180. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 
(2003). 
 181. See Slobogin, supra note 84. 
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Despite hostility to the exclusionary rule, and any number of proposals for 
reform, legislatures have not acted to provide alternative remedies.182 
In a prior article I argued for giving judges the option of suppressing 
evidence contingent on the failure to pay damages.183  This approach might 
overcome the psychological disadvantage of the exclusionary rule without 
risking overdeterrence.  If the entity employing the police regarded the 
damage award set as the alternative to exclusion as excessive, it could ac-
quiesce in exclusion.  Judges, however, probably would be more willing to 
grant suppression motions, on both the facts and the law, if they knew that 
the government had an escape hatch.  Presumably the government would 
be most willing to pay when the tainted evidence implicated especially 
dangerous offenders. 
The contingent exclusionary rule concept bypasses many of the weak-
nesses of traditional tort suits, but a different procedural vehicle by itself 
cannot solve the valuation problem that explains why judges and legisla-
tures have permitted the atrophy of the tort remedy against police.  Sup-
pressing evidence contingent on the failure to pay damages thus takes a dif-
ferent route to the same dead end as traditional tort remedies.  If the judges 
set damages too low, the government would always pay the damages, lead-
ing to a world much like the one that prevailed before Mapp.  If the judges 
set damages too high, the government would always choose suppression, 
and contingent exclusion would have changed very little besides adding a 
layer of procedural complexity. 
What if, however, the government responded to a successful suppression 
motion by pointing to specific remedial steps, such as a new training pro-
gram, a record-keeping program for stop-and-frisk or traffic stops, or dis-
ciplinary actions against the responsible officers such as reprimands, reas-
signments, demotions, or suspensions?  In this scenario, the threat of 
 
 182. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional 
Law: “Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again”, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1616-17 (1996) 
(noting proposals by Caleb Foote, Richard Posner, and Warren Burger); Louis Michael 
Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 
YALE L.J. 2281, 2303 (1998) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) (“Nonetheless, in the current political environ-
ment, the chance of replacing the exclusionary rule with a truly effective network of civil 
remedies is close to zero.”); cf. POLMAR & GRESHAM, supra note 99 (analyzing legislative 
incentives).  A decade after publication, Professor Slobogin’s alternative remedial scheme, 
see Slobogin, supra note 84, has not been adopted by any legislature.  The apparently in-
exorable pressure of political incentives, no matter how clearly documented, nonetheless 
does not prevent yet additional calls for legislative alternatives. See Samuel Estreicher & 
Daniel P. Weick, Opting for a Legislation Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclusio-
nary Rule, 78 U.M.K.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
 183. See Dripps, supra note 17. 
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suppression might deter at least as effectively as the executed threat.  I call 
the basic idea “virtual deterrence.” 
IV.  VIRTUAL DETERRENCE 
As we have seen, a rational police agency will change its operations to 
reflect the ways the exclusionary rule changes its incentives.  The very ex-
istence of the rule encourages the agency to conduct training programs in 
Fourth Amendment law, and to monitor and discipline officers.  When the 
courts grant suppression motions, this reinforces the general incentive and 
provides information to the force about that specific incident. 
What, exactly, do we want the police agency to do in response to suc-
cessful suppression motions?  That depends on the nature of the Fourth 
Amendment violation.  If the officers did not know the limits on their au-
thority, we want their employer to train them, and others with similar du-
ties, so that they do understand the law.184  Mandatory retraining may also 
have a punitive effect; think about traffic school as a sentence for driving 
offenses.  If the officers knew the law and broke it deliberately, we want 
the force to impose some sort of disciplinary sanction.185 
Sanctions against the offending officers have familiar purposes.  We 
want to deter these officers, specifically, from repeating their misconduct; 
we want to deter other officers, generally, from similar behavior; and when 
discipline takes the form of reassignment or dismissal, we want to incapaci-
tate the individual officers from future transgressions. 
The present arrangement relies on the police agencies themselves to es-
timate the levels of training and discipline that will maximize the value of 
the institution’s resources.  If the police were not trained and disciplined 
 
 184. See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of 
the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412 (1977) (“[K]ey to the rule’s effectiveness 
as a deterrent lies . . . in the impetus it has provided to police training programs that make 
officers aware of the limits imposed by the [Constitution] and emphasize the need to operate 
within those limits.” (citation omitted)).  Professor Slobogin is skeptical about the success of 
police training programs. See Slobogin, supra note 84, at 393.  The record of police res-
ponses to Mapp, and to various specific changes in Fourth Amendment law, see Dripps, su-
pra note 17, at 14, suggests exclusion influences police behavior, and it is hard to see how 
training could play no part in improved compliance.  On the other hand, if the studies Slo-
bogin cites turn out to be correct, so that sanctions rather than training are the only way to 
improve compliance, virtual deterrence can adjust to this reality by conditioning admissibili-
ty on discipline rather than education.  So long as there is some administrative response that 
does discourage future violations, virtual deterrence can incorporate that policy response. 
 185. See Orfield, supra note 165, at 80 (Chicago narcotics officers reported that both su-
periors and peers were involved in individual officers’ suppression rulings; frequent loss of 
evidence in suppression hearings could result in reassignment and bad faith violations might 
lead to dismissal in extreme cases). 
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with respect to constitutional standards at all, the force would lose many 
cases that might have been made with better police practices.  On the other 
hand, resources spent on police training are resources taken from other uses 
such as proactive patrol, and officer sanctions may induce undue passivity.  
As we have seen, properly understood, there seems now to be more under-
deterrence than overdeterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.186 
A. Virtual Deterrence: The Basic Idea 
Suppose that present exclusionary-rule practice were modified by bifur-
cating the substantive Fourth Amendment question and the remedial ques-
tion.  If the court hearing a suppression motion found a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, it might be required to consider the specific steps, un-
dertaken by the police department and/or the prosecutor’s office, by way of 
training and/or discipline, to prevent recurrence of the violation.  If the 
court concluded that these measures were adequate and reasonable, it could 
admit the evidence.  At least in theory, virtual deterrence might function as 
well as (perhaps even better than) the exclusionary rule, but also might cash 
in on the government’s evidentiary windfall without risk of overdeterrence. 
To begin with the overdeterrence point, if the employing entity con-
cluded that the specific remedial measures demanded by the court called 
for an undue commitment of scarce resources, or threatened individual of-
ficers with undue incentives for passivity, these executive branch officials 
could refuse to undertake the remedial measures (and thereby accept some 
responsibility for the loss of evidence that would then result).  The gov-
ernment could not be made worse off than it stands under the order sup-
pressing the evidence. 
As for the adequacy of the specific remedial measures, it is of course on-
ly a predicted consequence of exclusion that police departments undertake 
such measures now.  If the linkage between remedial measures and exclu-
sion is simply one of the incentives, suppressing the evidence after the re-
medial measures have been taken makes no sense.  Indeed, in a case like 
Herring, virtual deterrence improves on both the majority and the dissent.  
The majority sacrifices any incentive to reform for the sake of the convic-
tion.  The dissent sacrifices the conviction for the sake of a signal it cannot 
guarantee leads to reform.  Virtual deterrence demands actual reform from 
the government, and would stand a decent chance of getting it. 
If the government already has taken the steps we want exclusion to en-
courage, the exclusionary rule has served its purpose by a threat that need 
not be executed.  Recall the hypothetical case of the suppression motion 
 
 186. See supra Part II.C. 
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made by a defendant after the transgressing officers have been prosecuted 
and jailed.  Another helpful analogy is to practice under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 407,187 which bars proof of subsequent remedial measures to 
prove tort liability.  The rule is designed to avoid deterring tortfeasors from 
taking steps to reduce the likelihood of future accidents.188  Accordingly, it 
does not bar plaintiffs from proving remedial measures undertaken before 
the accident giving rise to the instant suit.189  Like Rule 407, virtual deter-
rence welcomes relevant evidence as soon as the remedial measures that 
exclusion is intended to encourage have in fact been implemented. 
For purposes of illustration (as well as to show that virtual deterrence 
does not depend on the court’s particular jurisdiction vis-à-vis the locus of 
the Fourth Amendment violation or the investigating officers), reconsider 
Herring.  Bad records in Dale County caused officers in Coffee County to 
make a groundless arrest.  The fruits of the search incident to that arrest 
were the basis of prosecution in federal district court. 
Under current law,the magistrate and the district judge had to choose be-
tween suppression and doing nothing, and chose to do nothing.  Virtual de-
terrence offers a third option.  Before accepting the magistrate’s recom-
mendation, the district judge might have asked the assistant prosecuting the 
case to submit an affidavit from the Dale County Sheriff indicating what 
steps, if any, had been undertaken to improve the record-keeping system 
that was causing arbitrary arrests.  If no such affidavit were forthcoming, or 
if in substance it said nothing was going to be done, the judge should have 
granted the suppression motion.  But something probably would be done; 
the Alabama authorities obviously wanted Herring put away.  And if noth-
ing were done, suppression would convey to other offices that there was no 
law-enforcement advantage in shoddy accounting. 
B. Pros and Cons 
There are two important and related advantages to virtual deterrence.  
The first is that evidence would not be lost.  It is a mistake to treat the loss 
 
 187. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 188. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that the rule’s anti-deterrent policy applies in strict-liability actions as well as negligence 
actions).  The majority of the circuits took this position, and it was subsequently written into 
the text of the Rule in 1997. 
 189. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes (“The amendment to Rule 407 
makes two changes in the rule.  First, the words ‘an injury or harm allegedly caused by’ 
were added to clarify that the rule applies only to changes made after the occurrence that 
produced the damages giving rise to the action.  Evidence of measures taken by the defen-
dant prior to the ‘event’ causing ‘injury or harm’ do not fall within the exclusionary scope of 
Rule 407 even if they occurred after the manufacture or design of the product.”). 
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of the evidence as a cost distinct from the costs of the Fourth Amend-
ment.190  But the loss of the evidence is a cost.  The Fourth Amendment 
commands that this cost be borne because the benefits of protecting liberty 
and privacy in a pool of cases exceed the costs of the evidence that thereby 
goes undiscovered. 
The Fourth Amendment, however, once violated, cannot be complied 
with retroactively.  When the veil of privacy is pierced in a single case, it is 
no longer part of a pool.  What the Fourth Amendment protects is liberty 
and privacy, not immunity from the substantive criminal law.  Suppose D is 
driving home drunk, and is at fault in a collision with a car driven by P.  P, 
it turns out, has just burgled D’s house, and the collision forces open P’s 
trunk, revealing D’s computer and flatscreen television. 
If law could, it would undo the injuries and the damage.  It cannot, so D 
owes P compensation for his injuries and the damage to his vehicle.  D also 
is subject to criminal prosecution for purposes of general deterrence and 
possible reformative treatment or education.  Surely, however, D is entitled 
to the fortunate recovery of his own possessions.  And P, once out of the 
hospital, will be prosecuted for burglary. 
Victims can be compensated, and police can be deterred.  That is all that 
law can do.  At least that is all it can do for the innocent, and it should not 
do more for the guilty.  If due steps are taken to ensure compliance in the 
future, the court and the executive authorities have satisfied their constitu-
tional obligations in response to a Fourth Amendment violation.  Defen-
dants would not lose their right to tort suits to compensate them for the loss 
of their legitimate liberty or privacy interests.  The guilty would have the 
same remedies as the innocent. 
The second advantage relates to the first.  If a ruling on the substantive 
Fourth Amendment question did not automatically trigger suppression, but 
only left the ball in the executive’s court to propose appropriate remedial 
measures, judges would be less biased against holding police action illegal.  
Evasions and fabrications would no longer be necessary to avoid the escape 
of the guilty. 
For low-cost police practices with substantial nonevidentiary benefits, 
such as stop-and-frisk, the exclusionary rule is only a weak deterrent.  
Nonetheless, to ensure the admissibility of evidence in particular cases, es-
pecially high-value cases, the executive authorities might agree to systemic 
reforms, such as record-keeping of the New York type, that the traditional 
exclusionary rule has not encouraged.  Virtual deterrence might produce a 
 
 190. See supra Part II.A. 
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higher measure of compliance with constitutional requirements than the 
current exclusionary rule. 
There are at least two problems with virtual deterrence.  The first is 
whether the defense would still have incentives to litigate suppression mo-
tions.  If the government routinely proposed a standard one-hour retraining 
session for the officers involved, and this were accepted by the courts, then 
the effect of the proposal would be to abolish the exclusionary rule de fac-
to.  The adequacy of the government’s proposed remedial measures would 
be determined in the first instance by the same trial judges who currently 
grant a significant number of suppression motions, and appealable to the 
same courts that maintain the exclusionary rule, so that outcome seems un-
likely. 
It seems more likely that the judiciary would welcome the option of pro-
tecting Fourth Amendment rights without suppressing evidence.  These are 
the same judges we trust with other constitutional rights.  They likely 
would insist on steps the government declines to take often enough to in-
duce defendants to continue making suppression motions. 
The remaining problem for virtual deterrence is monitoring compliance.  
The rules of criminal procedure do not provide for consent decrees!  Yet 
the gist of virtual deterrence is to convert the traditional suppression motion 
into a kind of institutional reform litigation.  Suppose the court finds that 
the government’s proposed remedial steps are adequate.  How does the 
court verify compliance? 
A representation that the individual officers responsible for the violation 
will undertake ten hours of retraining might mean, in practice, that the of-
ficers spend ten hours at a sports bar grousing about the judge.  Reassign-
ment might mean, in practice, reassignment to a choicer post.  Suspension 
might mean, in practice, a paid vacation.  Reprimands may be accompanied 
by invisible—but very real—asterisks. 
These problems are real, but not entirely insurmountable.  For example, 
if additional training were administered by persons or institutions outside 
the police organization, such as the prosecutor’s office, the judges them-
selves (perhaps retired, to avoid any possible conflicts), or law professors 
(education might be a two-way street in that variation!), the instructing par-
ty could verify the participation and cooperation of the police. 
Direct sanctions typically require a formal process by which public em-
ployees can appeal some decision of the employer.191  The labor-law 
 
 191. Often there is a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the employer and 
the officers, with a provision for arbitration. See, e.g., Whittie v. Doyle, 228 F. App’x 512 
(6th Cir. 2007) (arbitration hearing resulted in findings adverse to plaintiff, who then sued 
on free-speech-retaliation grounds).  With or without a CBA, due process guarantees te-
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process creates a record that would enable monitoring.  That process takes 
time, and it might result in factual findings different from those made by 
the criminal court that suppressed the evidence.  The suppressing court 
could accept the government’s undertaking even though the disciplinary 
steps might be undone by the labor-law process, or it might insist on a final 
determination of the disciplinary matter before admitting the evidence.  In 
short, monitoring would be a challenge that could be addressed only with 
some increase in procedural complexity, but it is not a decisive objection to 
virtual deterrence, given the advantages of the new approach. 
C. The Bottom Line on Virtual Deterrence 
In two situations, the problems of defense incentives and monitoring 
compliance might nonetheless leave intact a very good case for virtual de-
terrence.  The first of these is grafting the virtual-deterrence idea onto pro-
posals for recognizing an exception to the exclusionary rule when the 
charged offense is especially grave.192  These are relatively rare to begin 
with, and they now generate strong pressures to nullify the exclusionary 
rule by such moves as crediting implausible police testimony or finding in-
evitable discovery. 
In a homicide case like Massachusetts v. Sheppard193 or a major drug 
case like United States v. Bayless,194 a judicial option to declare the search 
illegal but accept an official commitment to undertake additional training 
for the individual officers or the force generally would probably yield high-
er compliance with the Fourth Amendment than now prevails.  It could not 
overdeter as the government could decline the conditions and accept sup-
pression.  With decades in prison at stake, defense attorneys would still 
 
nured employees a hearing before termination. See, e.g., Urban v. Tularosa, No. 97-2292, 
1998 WL 694465, at *4  (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 1998) (police officers “with a property interest in 
continued employment” are entitled to pre-termination notice and the opportunity to de-
fend).  Due process does not appear to require a hearing before reprimands of record that do 
not adversely change the employee’s stature or compensation. See Bloodworth v. City of 
Phoenix, 26 F. App’x 679, 682 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 192. See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 
(1974) (urging exception for “treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery and kidnapping by 
organized groups”).  For a review and critique of similar proposals, see Yale Kamisar, 
“Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 1 (1987).  For the suggestion that seriousness-of-offense factors into substantive 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, see Stuntz, supra note 92, at 866. 
 193. 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (admitting evidence of homicide found during search autho-
rized by hastily-modified form narcotics warrant that was not altered to particularly describe 
the evidence of the homicide described in the officer’s affidavit). 
 194. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting motion to suppress thirty-four kilo-
grams of cocaine and two kilograms of heroin found as result of challenged Terry stop), va-
cated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Judge Baer reversed himself after public furor). 
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move to suppress.  The court’s conditions might be unacceptable to the 
government, and the adequacy of those conditions could be an issue on ap-
peal. 
The second situation includes categorical exceptions recognized by cur-
rent law that permit use of tainted evidence in the government’s case-in-
chief.  The current exceptions to the exclusionary rule are predicated on the 
assumption that exclusion is either unnecessary or futile from the stand-
point of incentives for compliance.  At least when the theory is that there 
are countervailing incentives favoring compliance, so that exclusion is not 
necessary, it makes sense to require the government to prove the remedial 
steps it has taken before the court receives evidence under the existing ex-
ceptions.  Consider three such categorical exceptions: standing, good faith, 
and inevitable discovery. 
In the standing context, the search victim’s right to suppress is said to 
provide adequate deterrence, even when, as in United States v. Payner, the 
agents deliberately violated the victim’s rights with the purpose of exploit-
ing the standing doctrine to incriminate the target.195  But why speculate 
about adequate deterrence, as opposed to inquiring directly into what steps 
the government has taken to prevent recurrence of the illegality?  Remedial 
measures are something that can be documented.  If the government takes 
the position that adequate deterrence has been achieved, it should be able to 
point to the steps it has taken.  In “good faith” cases this might call for ad-
ditional training; in “bad faith” cases where the police knowingly broke the 
rules it might call for disciplinary sanctions. 
Inadequate monitoring is no objection here, because we are comparing 
virtual deterrence, with at least some representations and documentation, to 
assumed deterrence, with no representations or documentation at all.  
Likewise, current law gives the defense no incentive to raise constitutional 
jus terti claims, regardless of how flagrant the government’s misconduct 
may be. 
The good-faith exception for the fruits of erroneously-issued warrants 
does not result in underdeterrence, because the opportunity costs of search 
warrants give the police very strong incentives to comply with the probable 
cause requirement quite aside from the risk of lost evidence.196  When, 
however, the police rely on faulty records, whether kept by the courts, as in 
Evans, or by the police themselves, as in Herring, there is no similar disin-
centive against casual record-keeping practices that increase the scope of 
 
 195. 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding admissible against defendant papers stolen from X, 
defendant’s accountant, by surreptitious warrantless entry of X’s hotel room).  The actual 
facts are even more unsavory than the pallid parenthetical suggests. 
 196. See Dripps, supra note 113, at 929. 
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police power.197  In Herring, for example, it appears that the police were 
bent on pinning whatever they could on one of the usual suspects and asked 
about outstanding warrants for the purpose of searching Herring’s car inci-
dent to arrest. 
The Herring majority appears to take the view that Herring was illegally 
arrested but that this constitutional violation is too trifling to merit any re-
medial action whatsoever.  If the premise that the arrest was illegal is true, 
the conclusion seems impious.  At the least, before admitting the evidence, 
the court hearing the suppression motion ought to inquire about what steps 
have been taken to prevent recurrence.  If the answer is “none,” the case 
can hardly be classified as one of good faith. 
Herring illustrates one positive potential of virtual deterrence.  Like dry-
hole Terry stops, arrests based on bad-arrest records typically do not result 
in evidentiary fruit.  When, however, the police get really lucky, the exclu-
sionary rule gives the judiciary some systemic leverage.  Conditioning the 
admissibility of the evidence against Herring on improved record-keeping 
procedures might have induced administrative improvements that would 
have prevented the illegal arrests of many innocents.  Likewise, attaching 
strings to the admissibility of the massive drug seizure in Bayless could 
have led to systemic changes like record-keeping or reevaluation of police 
doctrine and training regarding stop-and-frisk generally.  If the reforms 
demanded by the judiciary are, in the judgment of law enforcement offi-
cials, not worth the resources or the incentive to passivity, the government 
could acquiesce in the suppression order. 
The inevitable discovery is thought to be justified because not admitting 
tainted evidence that would have been lawfully discovered anyway “would 
put the police in a worse position than they would have been in if no un-
lawful conduct had transpired.”198  Deterrence does not suffer because 
“[t]he need to adduce proof sufficient to discharge its burden, and the diffi-
culty in predicting whether such proof will be available or sufficient, means 
that the inevitable discovery rule does not permit state officials to avoid the 
uncertainty they would have faced but for the constitutional violation.”199 If 
inevitable discovery were factually transparent the doctrine might make 
 
 197. See LaFave, supra note 79, at 12 (“Perhaps the unstated assumption is that deter-
rence by way of the exclusionary rule is not needed with respect to negligent violations of 
the Fourth Amendment (or some species of them) because a sufficient level of deterrence is 
provided by some other force.”).  As LaFave points out, the only candidate for some such 
countervailing incentive is police professionalism, but that impulse is general rather than 
specific to police record-keeping, and is in any event in substantial measure a product of the 
exclusionary rule. See WALKER, supra note 63. 
 198. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984). 
 199. Id. at 457 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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sense.  The risk is that courts will find inevitable discovery on dubious 
facts to avoid suppressing evidence, especially in serious cases.  The avail-
ability of the virtual deterrence option in serious cases might encourage a 
more skeptical attitude toward inevitable discovery claims.  The Supreme 
Court itself, for instance, might reconsider the question whether the pre-
ponderance standard, rather than the clear-and-convincing standard, ought 
to apply.200 
In sum, virtual deterrence might cut the albatross of hard cases from the 
neck of judges ruling on suppression motions.  In typical cases involving 
drug possession or low-level dealing, the idea is probably not worth the ad-
ditional procedural complexity.  In two kinds of cases, however, virtual de-
terrence might come closer to optimal deterrence than current doctrine.  In 
major cases, the de jure application of the exclusionary rule is often nulli-
fied de facto.  In standing cases, and good faith cases outside the warrant 
context, the exclusionary rule does not apply de jure now, based on specul-
ative calculations of its deterrent impact.  In both types of cases, virtual de-
terrence might spur remedial steps when none now occur, and it might also 
encourage more judicial enthusiasm for the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the innocent, who rely on the guilty to regulate the police. 
CONCLUSION 
The “new” exclusionary rule debate has nothing new in it.  The current 
Supreme Court majority subscribes to a normatively unsound, and empiri-
cally unsupported, concept of overdeterrence.  The Herring dissenters in-
voke a conception of judicial integrity that mistakes the nature of Fourth 
Amendment rights by demanding more for the guilty than is due to the in-
nocent. 
Rigorous application of the normatively sound view of optimal deter-
rence of Fourth Amendment violations calls for a different analysis and, 
probably, very different results in the Calandra line of cases.  Justice Gins-
burg’s dissent suggests that this kind of rigor might—just might—return to 
the Supreme Court, but transferring that rigor to the courts hearing suppres-
sion motions is a less likely contingency. 
If the point to exclusion is deterrence, it makes sense to ask what re-
medial steps the government has taken in response to a violation before 
suppressing the tainted fruit.  For administrative reasons that process is 
 
 200. See id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To ensure that this hypothetical finding is 
narrowly confined to circumstances that are functionally equivalent to an independent 
source, and to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule, I would 
require clear and convincing evidence . . . .”). 
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probably not worth undertaking in typical cases.  When, however, the gov-
ernment admits illegality but offers the evidence anyway on the theory that 
it has incentives to take remedial steps besides suppression, the courts 
ought not to accept incentives when proof of concrete remedial steps can be 
demanded.  When the tainted evidence implicates the accused in especially 
serious criminality, conditioning admissibility on concrete remedial steps 
seems more faithful to the Constitution, and to good sense, than condition-
ing admissibility on implausible testimony or far-fetched substantive inter-
pretations. 
